POST v. MACKALL.—3 BLAND. 491

derstaud the nature of the directions which the Court is now called
upon to give respecting them.

Judges, all of whom are competent to sit on every appeal from the High
Court of Chancery; and the Constitution also declares, that "any three of
the said Judges of the Court of Appeals shall form a quorum to hear and
decide on all cases pending in said Court." Hence, it would seem, as every
decree must be signed, as in the English Court of Exchequer, by every
Judge who was present at the making of it, 3 Fowl. Exche. Pra. 168. to
mate a valid decree in equity by the Court of Appeals, it should be signed
by at least three Judges. The County Courts are constituted of three
Judges, any one of whom is made competent to hold a Court; and. conse-
quently, a decree of a County Court signed by any one of its Judges, be-
cause of his being the Court, must be deemed valid.

After various other proceedings, for the principal part of which see 10G.
& J. 67, this case was again submitted for a final determination.

BLAND, C.. 13th May, 1836.—It will be seen, by adverting to the proceed-
ings, that the defendant James Tilton. in his answer, relied on two distinct
grounds of defence, each of which apparently, covered the whole of the
plaintiff's cause of suit as regarded the real estate of the deceased; first, the
Statute of Limitations; and secondly, the sufficiency of the personal estate
of the deceased to pay all his debts. Considering the reliance upon the
Statute of Limitations, if sustained, as an entire bar, it was obviously un-
necessary to say any thing as to the sufficiency of the personalty. And, on
the reliance upon the statute by this defendant being declared, by the Court
of Appeals, to be only a protection of his interest in the realty, it could not
be proper, upon any allegation of his only, to call for an account of the per-
sonalty, because his interests having been thus fully protected, the taking
of any such account, at his instance only, might well be regarded, in rela-
tion to all others, as an impertinent and unnecessary interference with the
further progress of the case. The same principles apply to the answer of
Clara Tilton, who, in her answer, made after she had attained her full age,
has, in like manner, relied upon the Statute of Limitations and the insuffi-
ciency of the personal estate.

It appears, however, that the defendants Bennett and wife had also, in
their answer, relied on the sufficiency of the personal estate and the other
appropriated funds. That that allegation of theirs had been distinctly placed,
by the record, before the Court of Appeals; and, if available, in any degree.
in favor of the realty, seems to have necessarily called for a decree or direc-
tion from that tribunal, that an account be taken of the personalty; as usual,
in all cases of this kind, where the alleged insufficiency of the personalty
or appropriate fund is contested by an heir or devisee. —Campbell's Case. 2
Bland, 325: Hammond v. Hammond, 2 Bland, 347. 354.—But, as nothing has
been said by that tribunal as to any such account, this Court may now.
therefore, treat it as a conceded or established fact, that the personal estate
of the deceased, including so much of the profits and the sales of his real
estate as he had appropriated to the payment of his debts are insufficient for
that purpose; and proceed accordingly to direct the real estate indiscrimi-
nately to be sold.

The defendant Rebecca Gibson has had her claim, in lieu of dower, under
the will of her deceased husband, brought fully before the Court, by the
bill of complaint: and, yet she has made default, and still remains silent
and passive. The devise to her. in lieu of dower, may be entirely equiva-