464 BALTIMORE v. McKIM.—3 BLAND.

It is perfectly clear, from the proofs, that the strip of land in
question cannot, in any way, be regarded as an alluvion, the right
to which would accrue to the owner of the adjacent land to which
it had fastened; Browne v. Kennedy, 5 H. & J. 195; Ridgely v.
Johnson, 1 Bland, 316, note; The King v. Lord Yarborough, 10 Com.
Law Rep. 19: Gifford v. Lord Yarborough, 15 Com. Law Hep.
403; (g) but having been made, and built up, as a * wharf,
472 by John Smith and others, on land which it is certain did
not belong to them, it follows, that it must, like all such improve-
ments which a wrong-doer puts upon the land of another, become
the property of him to whose land it has been affixed. So that
this wharf has long since, in fact, become the absolute property of
the State to whom the soil upon which it was built most unques-
tionably belonged.

But it has been urged, that the whole of this strip of land called
Smith's wharf, is a public wharf, for the use of which the City of
Baltimore has, for a long series of years, charged and collected
wharfage, and, therefore, that the right of soil in it has been ex-
pressly vested in the city by the Act allowing the corporation to
charge and collect wharfage; 1827, ch. 162, s. 4; The Wharf Case,
ante, 361; because as wTharfage was the only benefit which could be
derived from this land, the Act which gave that sole benefit,
virtually and necessarily thereby gave an absolute right to the soil
itself. And further, that the granting of a patent would be in-
compatible with the rights of the public in general, if not with
those of the city in particular; and, therefore, it ought not to be
allowed to issue, since it could be attended with no good, and
would inevitably be used as the means of litigation and strife.

In England the subjects which may be granted by the king are
as numerous and as various as the sorts of property, and the kinds

(g) HAMMOND v. FORREST.—KILTY, C., 16th November, 1810. The hearing
of the caveat in this case came on in the land office on the 15th, when the
exhibits and depositions were read, and the case was argued by counsel on
each side.

On consideration, the Chancellor is of opinion, that the caveat ought to
prevail, and that the defendant is not entitled to a patent. It does not ap-
pear, however, that the ground in question is connected with the main land
by the bar, which is referred to from the letter N, on the plot. An objection
might be made from what is stated in the depositions, and marked on the
plot as to the course of the ferry-boat, which goes over the island, if. in that
case, it can be so called, or rather, by the intersection of the water, makes
two islands of the land.

But the question is taken up on the general principle of its being an island,
and according to the civil law; and according to the decree of the late Chan-
cellor, in the case of Ridgely v. Johnson, (1 Bland, 316, note.) it is considered
as belonging to the caveators, as owners of the land on the nearest side, who
appear in the part opposite a part of the island to be bounded by the river.

It is therefore Adjudged, Ordered, and Decreed, that the caveat be ruled
good.