BALTIMORE v. McKIM.—3 BLAND. 459

to time, for preventing disputes, cause all the lots taken up and
improved, or that shall thereafter be taken up, &c. to be regularly-
surveyed, substantially and fairly bounded and numbered. And
all after purchasers of lots, whether before or after the passiug of
this Act, shall be deemed to be within the said town: provided
their lots be within the outlines thereof; and shall have as good
estate in their lots, as if taken up, improved, and paid for under
the original laws erecting the said towns. And that all improve-
ments of what kind soever, either wharves, houses, or other build-
ings, that have or shall be made out of the water, or where it
usually flows, shall, as an encouragement to such improvers, be
forever deemed the right, title and inheritance of such improvers,
their heirs and assigns forever. 1745, ch. 9; 1836, ch. 63.

This law, it is obvious, according to the principles of justice,
applicable to the subjects of which it speaks, can only be so con-
strued as to authorize the owners of lots bounded by the tide of
the basin to acquire a right to vacant land without applying to
the land office, and without paying for it the stipulated price of
vacant land. It operates as a legislative grant, for and in con-
sideration of certain improvements, from which material and im-
portant benefits would result to the public. And the improve-
ments being the consideration upon the formation of which alone
the State parts with its right to the soil covered by the waters of
the basin; it is clear, that no right can vest under it, until the
specified improvements have been completed; lor, if they should
be left in an unfinished condition, it would amount to an abandon-
ment of the right to acquire a title in that manner. *Giraud's
Lessee v. Hughes, 1 G. & J. 249. This, however, is * a mode
of acquisition of which none can take advantage but natural 467
persons who hold lots bounded by the tide-water of the basin; in
whom and their heirs the acquisition is to vest as an inheritance.
It is obvious, therefore, that the city itself could acquire no right
of property in this way; and besides, a wharf, one of the kinds of
improvements mentioned as an example, being an extension of
" fast land into the water, the city never had any such land upon
or from which any improvements of the sort could be made or ex-
tended. 1836, ch. 63. But even natural persons can avail them-
selves oi' this privilege only in so far as the acquisition may be
made by improving their own lots in such a manner as not to
extend them in front of, or between the navigation of the basin
and any public street or other lot belonging to an individual.
Hale de Portias, 81; Smith v. Hollingsworth, ante, 381. As, for
example, John Smith, under this law, could not have acquired a
right to any land, covered by the waters of the basin, by improv-
ing upon, or tilling it up in any other than a south direction: be-
cause, in doing so, he would have crossed, or cut off navigation
from the next adjoining street or lot. Harrison v. Strett, 4 H. &