THE BELLONA CO'S CASE.—3 BLAND. 443

tion of property and the manufactories, which they were author-
ized to make, and to carry on, were such acts as an individual
might lawfully have done. Hence the whole scope of the Act of
incorporation, or contract between the State and the plaintiffs
was, that the authority to do those acts as a corporation, should
be secured * to them in that capacity, and nothing more.
The General Assembly did not; and, it may be affirmed, 450
could not enact, or covenant with the plaintiffs, that the land held
by them should be considered as an estate more favored and sacred
than that of any individual citizen of the Republic: for, as it has
been said, even the Parliament of England, with all its unlimited
sovereignty, cannot legally make any partial distinctions among
the subjects of the realm. Kames Pri. Eq. b. 2, c. 3. All or any
of the property of a citizen may be taken, upon a just compensa-
tion being made, and applied to the use of the public; and all
property belonging, in like manner, to a corporation, must also be
held liable to the same eminent domain, or peculiar power of the
government.

The only plausible ground upon which any portion of the terri-
tory of the Republic could be exempted from a liability to the
exercise of this power of the government of the State would be,
that it had been previously applied to some greater or equally
beneficial public use, with which the proposed new application was
incompatible. But there is no pretext for claiming an exemption,
upon that or any other principle, in favor of the land held by
these plaintiff's; because it cannot, in any sense whatever, be con-
sidered as having been appropriated to any public nse; it is merely
held as private property, for the peculiar emolument of its incor-
porated owners, and which they may dispose of at their pleasure.
The tenure by which they hold it forms no part of that which is of
the essence of their Act of incorporation, or the alleged contract
between them and the State, There is therefore nothing in the
Acts incorporating the plaintiffs, even considered as a contract,
which can be so construed as to prevent the condemnation ol their
land to a public use in the manner proposed by the defendants.

The plaintiffs have urged, that the application of their land to
the purposes of the railroad proposed to be made by the defend-
ants, is not such a public use as can justify the taking of it with-
out their consent; although it should be agreed, on all hands that
the private property of corporations as well as of individuals,
might be taken for any public purpose on a just compensation
being made for it.

Under our government the property of one man cannot be taken
without his consent, and given to another by any form of proceed-
ing; and, consequently, no citizen can be compelled to part with
* his property, even on a just compensation being made, but
for some public purpose. ' It is the public good alone which 451