416 McKIM v. ODOM.—3 BLAND.

seal, or in the manner specially prescribed to it. 1804, ch. 73, s. 6,
But there is no legislative enactment which directs in what mode
a corporation of any kind may be compelled to answer in case it
should neglect or refuse to do so.

It is admitted on all hands, that in a suit against a corporation
none of its members can be taken or personally punished, except,
perhaps as a last resort, on account of any contumacy in their cor-
porate capacity. The only mode of proceeding, either to enforce
an answer or obedience to a decree is by a distringas and seques
tration of the property of the body politic. Bac. Abr. tit. Cor-
poration, E, 2; Lynch v. The Mechanics Bank, 13 Johns. 127.
The State itself is regarded in many respects as a mere body
politic; 1785, ch. 36; and in the various instances where it becomes
necessary to have it made a party to the litigation, it is repre-
sented by its Attorney-General: in which cases, the course of the
Court merely allows, that he should be attended with a copy of
the bill; but he cannot be iorced to answer in any manner what-
ever; Willis Eq. Plea. 7; and therefore, if the bill cannot be taken
pro confesso against the State; 2 Mad. Pr. Chan. 335; 1 Fowl. Exch.
Pra. 401; Nabob of the Carnatic v. The East Indian Company, 1
Ves. Jun. 371; S. C. 1 Hoven. Supp. 149; the further progress of
the case must await his good pleasure.

Every corporation is and must be composed of, and conducted
by natural persons; yet the distinction between the natural and
artificial capacities and liabilities of its members has been drawn
in such a manner as to create the most serious inconvenience. A
body politic, it has been quaintly said, has no soul; and therefore
cannot be called on to answer under the obligation of an oath by
which a natural person may be bound. The Case of Sutton's Hos-
pital, 10 Co. 33. To avoid this difficulty the Court of Chancery
has had recourse to a singular shift; which it is admitted rests on
very questionable principles; it allows the secretary, book-keeper,
or some one or more of the chief members of the body politic to
be made co-defendants for the express purpose of obtaining an
answer on oath; which answer, contrary * to the general rule
421 in other cases, is received as evidence against the corpora-
tion itself. Fenton v. Hughes, 7 Ves. 289; Dummer v. Corporation
of Chippenham, 14 Ves. 253. Thus allowing the plaintiff to select
from among the corporators such one or more of them as he may
think proper to make witnesses and to extract from them only such
proof as may be entirely responsive to his case.

It is now settled, that a corporation may be charged in actions
ex delicto as well as ex contractu, notwithstanding the general rule,
that they can only act and bind themselves by means of their cor-
porate seal. For although the members of the body politic, in
their corporate capacity, cannot commit a crime, or perpetrate a
felony; yet, since the institution is governed by the intellectual