38 TESSIER v. WYSE.—3 BLAND.

Chancery here, in creditors' suits, always, since the adoption of
that statute, applied the same rules and principles to the claims of
* simple contract creditors, that it had before applied to
50 cases arising on the claims of specialty creditors. And con-
sequently, it never, in any case, threw upon a creditor the necessity
and burthen of alleging and proving the insufficiency of the per-
sonal estate of the deceased, as forming an essential part of his
title to obtain satisfaction by a sale of the realty; because that
was a fact which, from the nature of things, unacquainted as he
must be with his debtor's private affairs, it would, in most cases,
be impracticable for him to shew; and was, therefore, a matter with
which he had no concern. And as equity is bound to follow the
law, the Court could not upon any principle whatever throw upon
the creditor any such burthen. The allegation of the sufficiency
of the personal estate can only come from the heir, because it
would be of no avail to any other party; and as the benefit which
the heir was allowed to derive from it, was only as against the
personal estate, the issue as to the truth of such allegation was
therefore, one which could only, with propriety, be made up be-
tween the heir and the executor or administrator. The first clause
of this Act of Assembly, it is evident, merely refers, in general
terms, to these principles of equity, without making the least
change in any of them, or intimating, that a creditor, in suing
by bill in Chancery, was to encounter any new obstacle in any
form. So far, therefore, this Act of Assembly recognizes and
affirms the then existing law without making any alteration in it
whatever.

In regard to persons non compos mentis, as .spoken of in this Act,
it will be sufficient to observe, that although the Chancellor, in the
exercise of his jurisdiction, in cases of lunacy, has no power to
exempt either the person, or the estate of the lunatic from the
claims of his creditors; ,\et, where circumstances permitted, it had
always been deemed to be within the scope of his authority so to
order the management, or sale of a lunatic's estate as to secure to
him a maintenance from the proceeds of his property; and, for
that purpose, to postpone the payment of his debts by an imme-
diate sale or application of the capital of his estate as far as prac-
ticable. Shelf. Luna. 356; Ex parte Dikes, 8 Ves. 79; Ex parte
Philips, 19 Ves. 123. It is to these dilatory proceedings of the
Court, tor the benefit of persons non compos mentis, that this pro-
vision of this Act relates. And as it merely authorizes a sale to
be made in cases where, independently of this Act, a sale might
have been enforced under the Statute of 1732, this Act must be
understood as only intending *to declare, that there shall
51 be no postponement or delay, for the benefit of a person non
compos mentis, to the prejudice of creditors. Considered in that
way, and it can be considered in no other, it has certainly made no