254 WILLIAMS' CASE.—3 BLAND.

pay in proportion to the benefit he in fact took under the transac-
tion; and that the remainderman, or reversioner, was made to pay
with reference to his proportion of the benefit; which estimate and
adjustment must be made upon facts, not upon mere speculation.
White v. White, 9 TVs. 554; Allan v. Backhouse, 2 Ves. & Bea. 78.
In applying this rule for estimating the value of an estate for
life, or in order to make an apportionment between the several
owners of a real estate, it appears, that the English Courts of
justice have, latterly, in almost all cases, sought assistance from
the tables formed by mathematicians of {he expectation of life,
without receiving them, except, perhaps, in the case of the dis-
tribution of the assets of a deceased person's estate; Ex parte
Thistlewood, 19 Ves. 250; as in any respect conclusive. Heathcote
v. Paignon, 2 Bro. C. C. 167; Griffith v. Spratley, 1 Cox, 389;
Evans v. Chenshire, Belt's Supp. to Ves. 306; Gowland v. De Faria,
17 Ves. 25; Ex parte Thistlewood, 19 Ves. 236; Ex parte Whitehead,
1 Meriv 127; Davis v. Marlborough, 2 Swan. 147; Portmore v. Tay-
lor, 6 Cond. Chaw. Sep. 104; Newton v. Hunt, 7 Cond. Chan. Rep.
518; Wardle v. Carter, 10 Cond. Chant. Rep. 163; Ryle v. Brown,
6 Exch. Rep. 205. Because, as a basis for all those tables a certain
average rate of mortality being established or assumed, they are
then the result of calculations upon mere age, taking all lives of
the same age to be of equal value, considering none as bad. that
are ordinarily good. But the constitutions of individuals differ
essentially: the health of the same individual may have been ma-
terially affected by accident or climate; or he may have a latent
disease which has in a greater, or less degree, affected his duration
of life for many years. All such circumstances must be taken into
consideration; and, therefore, no ordinary table of the expecta-
tion of life, although it may afford much useful information, can
atone be taken as giving a correct general rule for estimating the
value of the life of any particular individual. Gwynne v. Heaton,
1 Bro. C. C. 2; Heathcote v. Paignon, 2 Bro. C. C. 167; Gibson v.

Jeyes, 6 Ves. 274; Ex parte Thistlewood, 19 Ves. 236.

In cases of pensions or annuities for life granted by government;

in cases of a life interest in land, not chiefly valuable because of

* thw houses erected upon it. where the title is unquestion-

242 able; and in cases of setting a value upon a life interest in
land in proportion To the estate in remainder or reversion in the
same land under the same title, no contingencies, affecting its
value, need be considered other than those of the expectation of
the life. But, in making an estimate of the value of other kinds
of life interests, there are other circumstances to be attended to
besides the uncertainty of the life during which they were to be
held; the frailties of the securities by which they are to be sus-
tained during that time must also be considered. For instance,
what an annuity is worth depends, in a great degree, upon the