WILLIAMS' CASE.—3 BLAND. 223

construed as to confine them to those cases only where it is proper
and necessary to sell the infant's estate for his maintenance and
education; that the general terms, "for the interest and advantage
of such infant," used in the first section, must be limited to mean,
" for the maintenance and education of the said infant," as spoken
of in the latter sections of them; 1816, ch. 154, s. 1, 6 and 8; 1818,
ch. 133, s. 2, and consequently, in order * to authorize a sale
of an infant's estate, under these laws, it must be stated 207
and shewn, that he has no other property; that he has no other
means of obtaining a maintenance and education from his prop-
erty, from a parent or otherwise; and that, under all circum-
stances, a sale of that, his only property, is indispensably neces-
sary to place it in safety, and to secure to him, from it. a mainte-
nance and education; and it is moreover my opinion, that all other
and more latitudinous interpretations and applications of these
laws, must be deemed unconstitutional and void.

These general and standing Acts of Assembly extending to the
utmost verge, and in some respects beyond the constitutional com-
petency of the General Assembly, have clothed this Court, unas-
sociated with any other tribunal, with a large, entirely new, and
exceedingly delicate discretionary power, as to the disposition of
the real estates of infants. It is a power which can, in no case,
be carried into effect, with the same degree of confidence as those
which the Court exercises in controversies between litigating
adults; for, in whatever manner a suit of this kind may be insti-
tuted, it is obvious, that the whole proceeding must be substan-
tially, and in fact, conducted without the actual appearance, or
any expression of opinion from the only person whose interest and
advantage is alone to be considered. It is a sort of judicial pro-
ceeding which may easily be got up, and brought before the Court
by persons actuated by motives entirely at variance with the inte-
rests of the infant; and which sinister motives cannot be so sea-
sonably detected as to prevent the designed sacrifice of the infant's
interests. For, according to the general practice, in all cases
where an infant is made a defendant, the plaintiff, or petitioner,
names the commissioner, and has the carriage of the commission
for taking the infant's answer by guardian; and, in cases of this
kind, the Chancellor having no means of obtaining information,
but through the petitioner, is under a sort of necessity of accept-
ing his nomination of three freeholders, to whom the commission
of view and valuation is to be directed. There evidently, there-
fore, can be no security that a correct description of all the several
component parts of the infant's real and personal estate has been
given in the petition, or shewn in any way, (g) or that all
the * materal facts and circumstances of the case have been 208

(g) It is stated in this petition, that these infants had "no other source of
revenue than this farm;" whence it might be inferred, that they had no