WILLIAMS' CASE.—3 BLAND. 221

be safely assumed, that the Legislature can, by no act, take the
property of an adult citizen from him and give it to another, for
any purpose, with or without compensation; and that no adult
citizen can be compelled to use, apply, or alienate his property in
any way whatever merely with a view to his own benefit and ad-
vantage. The holding and the application of private property, at
the pleasure of its owner, so it be not as a nuisance or made inju-
rious to others, according to the fundamental principles of our
government, are rights so absolute, that no power in the land can
touch or control them in any degree whatever. Infants, it is clear,
hold their property by the same kind of absolute and uncontrol-
able rights as adults. It is the duty of the State to protect all
her citizens; but more especially her infants, for whom she is
bound to provide maintenance and education, in case they should
be without parents or pecuniary means. The State has a deep
interest in the proper maintenance and education of her infants;
and, consequently, it must be within the constitutional competency
of her government to make any legal provision necessary to facili-
tate the application of the property of infants to such purposes,
as well for her own * benefit as to prevent such infants from
becoming idle paupers and a burthen to the community; and 205
therefore no law which provides for the preservation of their prop-
erty, and the proper application of their estates to their mainte-
nance and education, can be deemed an infringement of their
rights.

An infant may, apparently, succeed to property which cannot,
in strictness, be said to belong to him, because of the claims of
others. The creditors of the ancestor from whom the estate de-
scended, must be first paid before any part of it can be applied to
the use of the infant heir. An Act of Assembly which facilitates
the application of such an estate to the payment of the debts of
its late owner, merely gives to it its proper direction; and there-
fore, instead of violating, affirms the right to it, as deduced from
its deceased owner. Nor can any law which goes no further than
to provide for the application of an infant's estate to his mainte-
nance and education, be regarded as, in any respect, a violation
of such infant's right of property. An infant is, in general, in-
competent to contract; but he may, by contract, bind himself for
his maintenance and education; and hence a legislative enactment,
which facilitates such an application of his estate, co-operates
with the infant's legally qualified right to contract, in discharge
of a duty to himself, without trenching upon any of his rights.

The several tribunals of the judicial department of our govern-
ment, have been framed and established with a view to the deter-
mination of matters in controversy between individuals. The
Orphans' Courts have been entrusted with authority to appoint
guardians for infants; and to see that such guardians perform