SALMON v. CLAGETT.—3 BLAND. 193

they could not sue, nor derive any benefit from; because they were
their own; and an assignment of them according to the requisi-
tions of the implied contract, would have amounted precisely to
that which this agreement declared, a complete exoneration of
their liability, and nothing more. It also appears, that Salmon

*had lent his name to Thomas Clagett, which Salmon had
taken up at maturity; but these were responsibilities or 178
securities upon which Thomas Clagett could not have been sued,
upon assignment, in any form, from Salmon. The securities, which
a surety has a right to have transferred to him, must be such as
would have enabled the creditor to obtain satisfaction of his
debt from funds, or from persons other than the surety himself; but
in this case there were no such securities held by Salmon. It fol-
lows, therefore, that this objection also of the defendants must fail.

But the plaintiff contended, that even if the mortgage might
have been foreclosed at any time after he became liable on
his notes lent to Thomas Clagett; or after Thomas Clagett's
notes; or the money he lent him became due; and even if the
agreement of the 26th of May, 1828, should be considered as an
express enlargement of the time of payment; yet, that these sure-
ties cannot be discharged; because all the remedies have been re-
served.

It is laid down, that a composition with, or giving time to the
principal debtor with a reservation of the creditor's remedies will
not discharge the surety. The giving of time to the principal
debtor with a reservation of the remedies, has, in many cases, the
appearance of absurdity; because, when distinctly understood, it
seems to be almost a flat contradiction in terms. Such a leserva-
tion of remedies in order to hold the surety bound must amount to
this, that the creditor agrees to give time to the debtor; and yet,
that they both agree, that the surety may, at any time, force the
creditor to proceed against the principal by a bill quia timet, or by
paying the whole debt, have an assignment of all the securities
and proceed immediately himself against the principal debtor; or
in any other mode authorized by the assigned securities. Such
an agreement, reserving the remedies, might not, in many cases,
be of the least benefit to the principal debtor; since it leaves him
entirely at the mercy of his surety; ,\et if the parties do so ex-
pressly contract, the surety can have no cause to complain, that
the implied contract has been altered or impaired, in any way, to
his prejudice; and therefore he cannot be discharged. Ex parte
Gifford, 6 Ves. 807; Soultbee v. Stubbs, 18 Ves. 20; Clarke v. Devlin,

3 Bos, & Pul. 363; Gould v. Robson, 8 East, 576; The United States
v. Stansbury, 1 Peters, 573. (i)

(i) It has been provided, in regard to public debtors, that where an indul-
gence has been granted to such a debtor, by extending the time of payment,

13 3 E.