SALMON v. CLAGETT.—3 BLAND. 191

was given by Salmon to Thomas Clagett, so it was given in the
manner described in the deed. The proofs clearly establish the
fact, that the liability from Thomas Clagett to Salmon was incurred
ia the mode specified by the deed; therefore, I am of opinion,
that there is no foundation for this objection. Lamusse v. Barker,
3 Wheat. 148; Mason v. Pritchard, 12 East, 227.

It has also been insisted, that the credit has been extended, and
the time of payment enlarged, by the agreement of the 20th of
May, 1828. Whether that can be so considered must depend upon
what shall be deemed the true meaning of the mortgage.

I take the sense of that contract to be, that Salmon, upon the
faith of the property so pledged to him, agreed to lend his credit
to Thomas Clagett during a cettain time, and to a specified amount.
The sole object of that deed was to obtain for Thomas Clagett such
a credit; but if the mortgage might have been foreclosed, at any
time, to enforce payment for any parcel of goods sold; and of
every sum of money lent by Salmon to Thomas Clagett, as it be-
came * due, the very object of the deed might have been 176
defeated. He would not have obtained such a credit, as
could have been used by him, as a capital with which to prosecute
his business. The mortgaged property might have been sold, or
the sureties be forced, at once, to pay, when by postponing the
payment, under the assurance of the guaranty, until the 1st of
October, 1830, Thomas Clagett's business, even if he should fail,
might be so wound up as to produce no embarrassment, nor result
in loss to any one. For, in general, where a party undertakes to
do any act within, or upon the expiration of a limited time, he can-
not be sued and charged with a breach of his agreement before the
lapse of the specified time; unless he has himself previously
rendered the performance of his contract absolutely impossible.
Sir Anthony Main's Case, 5 Co. 21. The limitation of the amount
of the credit to $10,000, also shews it to have been the true mean-
ing of the parties, that Salmon, on his part, undertook and agreed
to give credit to Thomas Clagett to that amount, in the manner de-
scribed, until the 1st of October, 1830.

Much stress has been laid upon the fact, that the notes given
by Thomas Clagett and some others of the grantors, fell due long
before the 1st of October, 1830, and that Salmon being then un-
able to pay, he must then be considered as entitled to indemnity
by a foreclosure of the mortgage. But that very circumstance
shews, that it could not have been their intention to subject them
properly to a foreclosure of their mortgage immediately that those
notes fell due; because the express object, in so pledging their
property, was to sustain Thomas Clagett's credit to a period far
beyond that time. I am, therefore, of opinion, that the mortgage
could not have been foreclosed before the 1st of October, 1830;
and consequently, the stipulation in the agreement, that it should