SALMON v. CLAGETT.—3 BLAND. 185

ties, so that they can have no ground to complain of Salmon's acts
whatever they may have been.

Then passing from the subject of the suit, to the suit itself, it
is objected, that the plaintiff can have no relief in this case; be-
cause the suit has been instituted too soon; and because to per-
petuate the injunction merely, would be to lay the defendants sub-
ject to the caprice of the plaintiff without leaving them any
means of extricating themselves. These are the matters to be
considered.

In taking the position, that the mortgage is absolutely void,
* because the grantor, as administratrix, had no power to
make such a deed, I understand the defendants as making 169
no such objection to it, as a conveyance of the realty therein men-
tioned: and as also assuming the ground, that unless it can avail
the plaintiff as a deed proceeding from the administratrix, who
alone, among the grantors, had the power thus to sell, or pledge
the personalty, it must fail as to that altogether. I shall, there-
fore, as regards this position, consider this deed as embracing
nothing more than the property therein specified as the assets
which Elizabeth Clagett held as the administratrix of William
Clagett, deceased.

An executor or administrator is, in equity, regarded as a trus-
tee; but then, in equity, as well as at law, an administrator is
considered, in general, as the absolute owner of the assets of the
deceased, whether they be legal or equitable, or choses in action.
The exercise of the powers of unqualified ownership to a certain
extent is indispensably necessary to enable him to execute his
trust, and to discharge his duty to advantage, and also to prevent
the general inconvenience of implicating and entangling third per-
sons in inquiries as to the application he may propose to make of
the money produced by the conversion of the assets. A fair pur-
chaser for a valuable consideration is, in no way, bound to see to
the application of the purchase money by an executor. He cannot
have the means of knowing the debts of the deceased: and is,
therefore, absolved from all inquiry respecting them. Upon these
general principles, not even a creditor of the deceased is permitted
to follow the assets so aliened; for the demand of a creditor is onlj
a personal demand against the executor iu respect of the assets
come to his hands, but no lien on the assets. And a specific or
residuary legatee can stand upon no higher ground, in this respect,
than a creditor. Nugent v. Gifford, 1 Atk. 463; McLeod v. Drum-
wond, 14 Ves. 359; ti. C. 17 Vet,. 153; Keane v. Robartx, 4 Mad.
357; Power Morg. 136, note.

The only qualification of this general rule is, where the transac-
tion is, in some way, tainted by fraud. Every person who acquires
personal assets by a breach of trust, or devastavit in the executor
or administrator is responsible to those entitled under the will, or