166 SALMON v. CLAGETT.—3 BLAND.

him from that discovery which he requires by his bill. But although
the plea may advance some new matter, yet it may be, that it only
denies some fact affirmed by the plaintiff, and which is so essential
to his case, that without establishing its truth he cannot recover.
Drew v. Drew, 2 Ves. & Bea. 159. If a plea be overruled generally,
the defendant is ordered to answer; or it may be wholly overruled
as a plea, leaving it to stand for an answer, with or without liberty
to except; or it may be allowed to operate as a plea, for the pur-
pose of protecting the defendant from some particular discovery,
and to stand for an answer with liberty to except as to the rest.
Pusey v. Desbouvrie, 3 P. Will. 321; Brereton v. Gamitl, 2 Atk.
240; Child v. Gibson, 2 Atk. 603: King v. Holeombe, 4 Bro. C. C.
439; Spurrier v. Fitzgerald, 6 Ves. 548.

But a plea admits the truth of the facts set forth in the bill, that
are not particularly covered and denied by it; and therefore, if the
defendant fails to establish the truth of his plea, on issue joined
thereon, as to all the discovery sought by the bill, and which the
defendant protected himself from making by his plea, the plaintiff
is left precisely in the situation of having had his bill taken pro
confesso. But that may be; and, in many cases, is far from answer-
ing his purpose. The disclosure of facts which the defendant
alone is capable of making, and of which the plaintiff is unable to
adduce any proof, may be essentially or indispensably necessary to
enable him to obtain the relief he is in quest of. Consequently,
where a discovery is needful to the plaintiff he shall not, under
such circumstances, lose the benefit of it; as the Court will order
the defendant to be examined on interrogatories to supply the de-
fect. Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. 246; Hawdry v. Trollop,
Nelson, 119; Mitf. Plea. 240; Brown v. Wilson, 4 Hen. & Mm. 481.
For the same purpose of supplying the defect in * cases
148 where the Act of Assembly allows the plaintiff to proceed on
the default of the defendant, it is provided, that whenever the bill
shall charge any matter as being within the private knowledge of
the defendant, the plaintiff may, on making affidavit, in open
Court, that such matter does rest in the private knowledge of the
defendant, have the bill, as to such matter, the same being suffi-
ciently alleged, taken pro confesso, and have a final decree accord-
ingly. 1820, ch. 161, s. 2. But where the relief sought can be ob-
tained without the discovery of any fact by the defendant, the
plaintiff may, at once, have a decree, without either interrogating
the defendant, or making any affidavit of the truth of the facts
alleged in the bill as to which the defendant ought to have
answered.

The meaning of a demurrer, or a plea, is to intercept, in an early
stage, a cause which must ultimately end in nothing, Freeland v.
Johnson, 2 Anstr. 407; or to prevent a discovery that may be pre-
judicial to the defendant. It is, therefore, important, in most cases,