164 SALMON v. CLAGETT.—3 BLAND.

ble, and a fraud in this Court. Chetwynd v. Lindon, 2 Ves. 450.
If, however, it should in any manner appear by the *pro-
145 ceedings, or be shewn, that the answer would criminate, or
subject him to a forfeiture, he cannot be compelled to give it; and
this privilege extends not only to the broad and leading fact; but
to any fact which may furnish a step in the prosecution; and is
likewise so applied as to protect a husband or wife from being com-
pelled so to answer as to criminate the other. Wrottesley v. Sen-
dish, 3 P. Will. 238; Cartwright v. Green, 8 Ves. 405; Claridge v.
Hoare, 14 Ves. 59; Parkhurst v. Lowten, 2 Swan. 214; McIntyre v.
Hancius, 16 John. 592. And although one may avail himself of
this privilege, when he can safely do so, by demurrer, or plea; Bea.
PL Eq. 278; yet he is under no obligation to take that course, for
it may be, that he could not demur; because, that might be to
admit the facts to be true. Honeywood v. Selwin, 3 Atk. 276. But
the claiming of this privilege never creates a dei'ence against relief
in this Court; therefore, as in case of usury, or forgery, if proof
can be made of it, the Court will let the case go on to a hearing;
but will not force the party, by his own oath, to subject himself to
punishment for it. Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. 246; Singery
v. Attorney- General, 2 H. & J. 490.

Again, if the defendant has obtained his knowledge of the facts,
concerning which the bill requires him to answer, as an attorney,
or solicitor; and, he so avers in his answer, it will be deemed con-
clusive and sufficient. The policy of the law has established it as
the privilege of a client, that no facts which he communicates to
his attorney or solicitor as such, shall be disclosed upon any occa-
sion without his permission. The Court, before which an attorney
or solicitor is called, will not suffer him to divulge the secrets of
his client; and therefore, a plaintiff cannot be allowed to draw
forth such communications, either by placing the attorney in the
situation of a mere witness, or of a defendant to his suit. Wright
v. Mayer, 6 Ves. 281; Parkhurst v. Lowten. 2 Swan. 194; Greenhough
v. Gaskill, 8 Cond. Cha. Rep. 394; Wilson v. Rastall, 4 T. R. 753.

Again, if the documentary evidence, called for by the bill, be ot
a public nature, which the defendant holds as the keeper of such
public records, which are open to all, and exemplifications of which
may be obtained by any one, on paying the legal fees; and it is
not alleged in the bill, that he had hindered any person from search-
ing, or refused copies on payment of his fees, his answer, that he
doth not know any thing that is prayed in the bill, but as an offi-
cer, will be deemed sufficient, Delove v. Bellamey, 2 Eq. Ca.
Abr. 66.

*And again, if the bill makes a mere witness a defendant
146 he need not demur, or plead; but if he answers and disclaims
all interest whatever in the matter in controversy his answer is
conclusive and sufficient; because, having thereby reduced himself