WALSH v. SMYTH.—3 BLAND. 15

tent to which his and Casena\e's interests were likely to be affect-
ed by the continuance, or dissolution of the injunction. James
Walker, therefore, could not have had any plausible pretext for
asking, at this time, for any further indulgence, or to be allowed
to come in and sustain the equity upon which the injunction had
been granted. But Walker has been dead more than twenty years;
and, during all that time, and when this decree was passed, there
was, in fact, no one to whom notice could have been given by these
defendants to revive. or have the injunction dissolved. A notice
entered on the docket would have been nugatory and a mere waste
of time. So that if it could not have been dissolved without notice
of any kind, after such a lapse of time, it must have been allowed
to stand, in effect, as a perpetual injunction. I am therefore of
opinion, that under such circumstances the great lapse of time
must of itself be deemed a sufficient ground to entitle any of the
surviving parties, or the representative of a defendant, to claim and
move for an immediate and total dissolution of the injunction
Willis v. Yates, 8 Cond. Cha. Rep. 512.

It has been urged, however, that as, Casena\e was originally a
party with Walsh in this bill by which they jointly asked to have
Smyth and Lynch, the vendors, decreed to refund the purchase
money which had been paid to them, on the ground, that the
consideration of the whole contract was fraudulent and had tailed,
his representative was therefore a necessary party, without whom
there could be no valid decree or regular dissolution of the injunc
tion.

* But, although they might be allowed to join, it was not
indispensably necessary that both Walsh and Casenave 25
should have been originally made parties to this suit. The con
sideration of all the bonds was certainly one and indivisible, as
regarded all the defendants who held and claimed payment of
them; and that consideration, being joint, when put in issue,
must stand or fall as regards them all. The relief, howe\er,
asked by Walsh and Casenave, was not so necessarily and indis-
solubly conjoined; they did not derive their title through a con
veyance from several, some of whom were not parties to the suit;
Dandridge v. Washington, 2 Peters, 376; nor did they or either of
them ask the distribution of a fund in which they or either of
them, with others, claimed a right to participate. Hunt v. Wick
liff, 2 Peters, 215. Either of them, without prejudice to the other,
might have waived the benefit of any substantial ground of relief
in this case, of which, both might have taken advantage. If their
bonds had been tainted with usury, a plea of usury sustained in
favor of one would not, of itself, be a bar to a recovery against
the other, who did not choose to rely on am such defence.
Selwyn's N. P. 582 Where a party rests his right to relief or
recovery against several upon the validity of a claim or con-