SALMON v, CLAGETT.—3 BLAND. 111

A deed or mortgage given to secure the payment of money cannot be ob-
jected to by a party, because of its not having been recorded.

may be granted in many cases where an action of waste will not lie. Ibid.
If the plaintiff by his bill puts the title in issue, or if he states that he has
brought an action at law to try the right, he may have an injunction to stay
waste pending the suit or action. Ibid. Such an injunction does not re-
strain the defendant from cultivating or making any ordinary use of the
land. A mere threat to commit waste is a sufficient foundation for an in-
junction before any waste has been done. Ibid.

C., the owner of a lot of ground and building, leased to A. who was to
leave the premises at the end of his term in good condition. A. sub-leased
to B. who, according to the allegations of C's bill asking for an injunction,
had begun to tear away a part of the front of the building to put in a side
door and to make various alterations. Held, that such acts constituted waste
by materially injuring the building; that compensation at law was too remote
and contingent and not equal to the urgency of the case, and that an injunc-
tion should be granted. Baugher v. Crane, 27 Md. 37. A lessor may by in-
junction prevent the lessee, or those claiming under him, from converting
the demised premises to uses inconsistent with the terms of the lease and
from committing waste by making material alterations. Maddox v. White,
4 Md. 72. Injunction to prevent a tenant from removing certain articles as
alleged waste refused. Gallagher v. Shipley, 24 Md. 407. As to when a
creditor seeking to sell real estate for the payment of debts may have an
order restraining waste, see Warfield v. Owens, 4 Gill, 364; Tessier v. Wyse,
3 Bl. 29; Williams' Case, Ibid, 186.

Where there is privity of title, as between tenants for life or years and the
reversioner, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show irreparable injury or
destruction to the estate to entitle him to have the waste enjoined. But as
between strangers or parties claiming adversely, there is no distinction be-
tween trespass and waste and in both cases the injury must be shown to be
irreparable before an injunction will be granted. George's Creek Co. v. Det-
mold, 1 Md. Ch. 372. Where there is a controversy pending in equity in-
volving the title to land, an injunction restraining waste upon it may be
applied for by petition in the cause. Green v. Keen, 4 Md. 99. As to waste
by a mortgagor, see post, sec. IV.

3. Nuisance. The criterion for determining whether an existing or threatened
nuisance to a party's dwelling will be restrained, is whether the acts com-
plained of does or will produce such a condition of things as, in the judg-
ment of reasonable men, is naturally productive of actual physical discom-
fort to persons of ordinary sensibilities, and tastes, and as, in view of the
circumstances of the case, is unreasonable and in derogation of the rights
of the complainant. Dittman v. Repp, 50 Md. 516. Noise alone, if it be
such as to produce actual physical discomfort to a person of ordinary sensi-
bility, may create a nuisance and give a right to an action at law or an in-
junction, although such noise may result from the carrying on of a trade in
a city. Ibid. If, in addition to the mere noise made by the working of
machinery in the building of a brewer adjoining plaintiff's dwelling, there
are strong vibratory motions which shake the dwelling and render it unfit
for habitation, such a state of things is clearly a nuisance which will be
restrained. Ibid.

If a manufacturing establishment be created in immediate proximity to
dwellings and in its operation large volumes of smoke, offensive odors and
noxious vapors are emitted, thereby materially affecting the comfort of the