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100 HEPBURN'S CASE.—3 BLAND.
the suit; or after judgment to procure satisfaction. The forfei-
ture, though nominally to the king, in truth goes to the plaintiff
towards payment of his demand. If the outlaw appears, pays all
the costs, puts in sufficient bail, and does * everything he
119 can to put the plaintiff in as good a condition as he would
have been in originally; or if after judgment the outlaw pays the
debt and costs, the Court reverses the outlawry upon motion without
any writ of error. Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2549; Morley v. Strom-
bom, 3 Bos. & Pul. 254; Tidd Prac. 109, 135: Davis v. Davis, 2
Atk. 23; Edgel v. Haywood. 3 Atk. 356. These are the special and
general modes of proceeding, according to the English law. And
it is now settled, that a creditor may, in cases failing within the
jurisdiction of the admiralty, proceed to -obtain satisfaction from
his debtor resident abroad, by attaching his property in this
country. Manro v. Almeida, 10 Wheat. 473.
The mode of proceeding by attachment to obtain satisfaction
from property found here belonging to a. non-resident debtor,
was certainly established in Maryland as early as 1647, if not be-
fore. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 555. The Acts of Assem-
bly in relation to it have been always considered as laws regulat-
ing process for the more effectual recovery of debts, or as provid-
ing a. special auxiliary remedy for the recovery of debts. Campbell
v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 555; Davidson v. Beatty, 3 H. & McH. 616;
Barney v. Patterson, 6 H. & J. 201. An attachment has always
been considered, from its very nature, as intended solely for the
benefit of our citizens: before the Revolution a person not an
inhabitant of the Province could not sue out the process; nor can
an alien now have it; Burk v. M'Clain, 1 H. & McH. 236; Yerby v.
Lackland, G H. & J. 453; though an inhabitant of this or any other
State or Territory in the Union may sue it out. 1825. ch. 114. It
is intended to enforce the payment of debts only: it will therefore
lie on a judgment, bond, note, account, or the like; but not on a
covenant, bond with collateral condition for trespass, &c. The
State v. Beall, 3 H. & McH. 347. It may be levied on any lands
and tenements, goods and chattels, rights and credits of the de-
fendant, that can be found in or out of the hands of others, or in
the plaintiff's own hands; or it may be levied on an equitable in-
terest in real estate: Campbell v. Morris, 3 H, & McH. 537; on a
vested interest in any property; on a debt due by judgment; or
now by decree, 1831, ch. 321, on a debt before it is due; or on any-
thing that may be taken in execution. Wells v. Gheselin, 1 H.
& McH. 91; 1832, ch. 307. And in general, the garnishee may
plead all things in defence that the defendant might have pleaded.
Masters v. Lewis, 1 Ld. Raym. 56; M'Daniel v. Hughes, 3 East,
367; Chase v. Manhardt, 1 Bland, 344.
One of the most accomplished of the lawyers of Maryland, be-
fore * the Revolution, gave it as his opinion, which has been
120 virtually
sustained by adjudications subsequent thereto,
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