purchaser with notice, as in this instance, at the sheriff's sale,
bought and paid for nothing more than the naked equity of redemp-
tion; hence, it is clear, that if he were allowed to take advantage
of that, as a total reduction of the incumbrance, he would derive
a benefit, for which he had paid nothing, nor given any equiva-
lent whatever, which cannot be admitted. It follows, therefore,
that the mortgagor must, at the hearing before this case is fin ally-
disposed of, be permitted to take the place of the mortgagee to
obtain reimbursement, so far as his interest, other than the mort-
gaged property, may have been taken and applied to the reduc-
tion and partial .satisfaction of this incumbrance. How such an
adjustment i,« to be made, need not now be determined, as it is a
matter which may well be permitted to stand over for further con-
sideration. But to the extent of the reduction of this incumbrance
made by the payment of the $68.43, raised by a sale of the mortga-
gor's interest, it is perfectly clear, that the mortgagor is a proper
and necessary party. Jackson v. Hull, W John. Rep. 481; Tice v.
Annin, 2 John. Ca. Ch. 125.

In regard to the second ground. The equity of redemption,
and the manner in which it has been sold. In England, it has
been held, that where the mortgagor has been declared a bankrupt,
* a bill of foreclosure should be brought against his assignees 682
alone, without making him a party. This exemption of the
bankrupt from being called on as a party, is, however, expressly
founded upon the fact of his whole estate having been vested in
his assignees; and of a bill of foreclosure being limited in its na-
ture to the obtaining of satisfaction .from a particular fund, in
which he had been deprived of all manner of interest by a legal
assignment, which he could in no way invalidate, deny, or ques-
tion; and also, upon the ground, that in no event; nor by any form
of decree, could the proceedings in that suit be applied for the
benefit of the bankrupt; or be used so as to make him liable for
anything, or to any amount. For it is admitted, that if such a
bill sets forth any kind of actual interest in the bankrupt, which
should be bound by the decree, it will be necessary to make him a
party to the suit to foreclose. Griffin v. Archer, 2 Anstr. 478; Ben-
field v. Solomons, 9 Ves. 77; Whitworth v. Davis, 1 Ves. d; Bea. 545;
Lloyd v. Lander, 5 Mad. 282; Collins v. Shirley, 4 Cond. Cha. Rep.
592.

But here the mortgagor is not bankrupt, nor in the condition of
bankrupt; nor in the similar situation, according to our law, of an
insolvent debtor, whose whole estate had been vested in a trustee
for the benefit of his creditors. There has been nothing stated,
nor as yet shewn, by which it appears, that, as in cases of bank-
ruptcy or insolvency, he has been exonerated and discharged from
all liability for this debt; so, that if the mortgaged estate should
not, of itself, produce a complete satisfaction in the way in which