638 WARING v. WARING.—2 BLAND.

ages of eighteen and twenty-one years, could not have an actual
guardian appointed lor them by the Orphans' Court. Where-
upon he prayed that a guardian might be appointed for them by
this Court.

BLAND, C., 22d September, 1830.—Upon a careful * con-
674 sideration of the several legislative enactments in relation
to the ages at which females are to be endowed with certain
capacities, it will be seen, that it has been merely declared, that a
female shall be accounted of full age to receive her estate at the
age of eighteen, or day of marriage, which shall first happen; 1715,
ch. 39, s. 15; 1829, ch. 216, s. 5, 6; that on receiving her estate
after that age she may execute a release therefor to her guardian;
1829. ch. 216, s. 7; (b) and that no will shall be good and effectual
to pass any interest in land unless the person making the same, if
a female, be of the full age of eighteen years. 1798, ch. 101, sub-
ch. 1, s. 3. And following out those principles upon which a
capacity to receive, hold, and dispose by will of their estates at the
age of eighteen, was conferred upon females, the jurisdiction of
the Courts, clothed with the common and ordinary powers in rela-
tion to infants, has been accordingly limited by declaring, that the
Orphans' Court should only have authority to appoint a guardian
to a female infant until the age of eighteen, or marriage; and that
such guardian should then account and deliver up all the property
in his possession to such female. 1798, ch. 101, sub-ch. 12, s. 1
and 15; 1829,-ch. 216, s. 5, 6.

But there is nothing in any of those legislative enactments con-
ferring such qualified capacities upon females, or by which the
jurisdiction of the Orphans' Courts has been so limited which can
be construed to have altered the general rule of the common law
as to age; or from which females can be construed as of full age
at eighteen in any other respect, or for other purpose whatever
where the legal capacity has, by the common law, been limited to
the full age of twenty-one years. Davis v. Jacquin, 5 H. & J. 100.
And since it has been expressly declared, in immediate connexion
with the matter, that nothing contained in the general Act, regu-
lating the powers and duties of the Orphans' Court, should be con-
strued to affect the general superintending power exercised by the
Court of Chancery with respect to trust; 1798, ch. 101, sub-ch. 12,
s. 16; and since it has also been expressly enacted, that a sale of
the real estate, as prayed for in this instance, may be decreed in
order to save the personal, with the consent of all parties of full
age, and the actual guardian of minors; 1818, ch. 193, s. 8; Pue v.
Dorsey, 1 Bland, 140, note; Partridge v. Dorsey, 3 H. & J. 305; it

(b) And since they have been endowed with a capacity to execute powers
of attorney for such purposes, 1831, ch. 305, s. 5.