ANDREWS v. SCOTTON.—2 BLAND. 633

* bill against his debtor, for the balance of the debt; because
it would be at variance with the substantial nature of the 668

case set out in his bill; which is, that he should by that proceed-
ing in rent, obtain satisfaction of his claim from the pledged sub-
ject itself, either by having an absolute title assured to him in the
form of a foreclosure; or by having it sent into the market, and
the money due to him, raised by a sale; and not that he should
be allowed to enforce payment of his whole debt, by proceeding
against the person of his debtor, or against any other of his prop-
erty than that so mortgaged. And besides, to pass a decree for
the payment of the balance, would be to grant relief in a case
where it is most manifest, the creditor might be as effectually re-
lieved at law. Powel Mort. 15, note L; Wood v. Fulton, 2 H. & G.
72. But there is no rule of equity by which he can be delayed or
enjoined from recovering the balance remaining so unsatisfied, in
an action at law upon the bond, note, covenant, or assumpsit.
And these principles of equity appear to have been indirectly re-
cognized by the Legislature, in an Act for the benefit of foreigners,
who lend money on mortgage here, by which it is declared, that
if sufficient be not raised in such case, by a sale for the satisfac-
tion of such foreign creditor, the Court shall decree the balance
to be paid by the mortgagor; 1784, ch. 58; and they appear to
have been in like manner recognized, by an adjudication of the
Court of Appeals. Wood v. Fulton, 2 H. £ G. 72.

* Hence, it is clear, that in all cases, either before or after
a decree for a sale, if the mortgaged estate should not sell 669
under the decree, for enough to satisfy the debt, the creditor may
prosecute or institute a suit upon the bond, or any other collateral
security, and recover the balance.

The equitable lieu held by the Court, as in this instance, is in
the nature of a mortgage; the estate may be sold under it, as
under a decree upon a mortgage; Ex parte Hunter, G Ves. 94; and
considered as a security for the payment of money, it is, to all
intents and purposes, a mortgage. And there is nothing, accord-
ing to any fair principle of analogy, which should forbid the pur-
suing of any other remedy for the recovery of a debt, secured by
such an equitable lien, any more than suing on a bond for a debt
secured by a mortgage.

In this case, there has been no bond or note given directly for
the payment of the purchase money. The appeal bond was not
given for the payment of the purchase money as such. But, by
the order of the 12th of May, 1826, it was adjudged, that Samuel
Anderson, was in fact, the purchaser, and that he should pay the

nation of the matters in dispute, and to a final decree, in the same manner
as if the said defendant had originally appeared before him.—[1795, ch. 88,

s.1.]