630 ANDREWS v. SCOTTON.—2 BLAND.

lie can recover but- one entire satisfaction. Smith v. Woodcock, 4
T. R. 691. And so too under the process of this Court, which is
more effectual than that of the common law tribunals; there may
be a sequestration against the goods, although the party himself
is in custody upon an attachment: whereas at law, if a capias ad
satisfaciendum is executed there can no fieri facias issue. Morris
v. The Bank, Cas. Tem. Tal. 222; Martin v. Kerridge, 3 P. Will. 240.

Where the debt has been secured by a mortgage, covenant to
repay, and a bond, the creditor may be allowed to pursue all his
remedies at once. He may bring an action of covenant to repay
the money; institute an ejectment against the tenant in posses-
sion; file a bill in equity to foreclose; and also maintain a suit
upon the bond at the same time. But he cannot have the mort-
gaged property awarded to him by a decree of foreclosure, and
also recover the money or any part of it from the debtor by a suit
upon the covenant or bond. Powel Mart. 204, 966; Toplis v. Baker,
2 Cox, 123.

The mortgaged estate is considered as a pledge sufficient for
the satisfaction of the debt; and as having been so taken by the
parties themselves by the nature of their contract. Therefore if
the creditor, on his bill in equity, has a decree to foreclose and
nothing more, he is held to have obtained that kind of satisfaction
of his claim for which he stipulated; and if after such a decree he
sues upon the bond, he thereby opens the decree, and admits the
right of the mortgagor to redeem; because by the institution of
the suit he disclaims the satisfaction he had obtained by the
666 * decree. And if he has placed it out of the mortgagor's
power to redeem, by aliening the estate after the decree, he will be
perpetually enjoined from the proceeding upon the bond. But if
the creditor on his bill in equity, instead of a decree to foreclose,
obtains a decree for a sale; and the mortgaged estate sells for less
than the debt, the balance may be recovered in an action on the
covenant or bond, without opening or affecting such a decree for a
sale, by which the pledge itself is not taken as a satisfaction as by
a decree to foreclose. Goodman v. Grierson, 2 Ball. & Bea. 279;
Davis v. Battine, 6 Cond. Cha. Rep. 404. Hence it is evident, that
the use of a mortgage covenant, or bond to repay is to enable the
mortgagee to recover his debt as far as practicable, in that way,
leaving him to his right of foreclosure, or sale of the mortgaged
property, for the recovery of the balance; or as a means of recover-
ing the residue of his debt by an action on the bond or covenant,
in case the estate on a sale should prove inadequate to the burthen
of the mortgaged money. Powel Mort. 15, note L; Tooke v. Hart-
ley, 2 Bro. C. C. 126; S. C. 2 Dick, 785; Perry v. Barker, 8 Fes.
527; S. C. 13 Ves. 196; Greenwood v. Taylor, 4 Cond. Cha. Rep,
381.