624 ANDREWS v. SCOTTON.—2 BLAND.

written contract of sale to the appellant, executed by both the ap-
pellant and appellee, which mentions fully the terms of sale, and
which is understood to be the sale ratified by the Chancellor.
Under this view of the subject, this Court are of opinion that there
is nothing in the objection that the appellant was not reported to
the Court as the purchaser of the property, and that a good title
cannot be conveyed to him in consequence of this irregularity in
the proceedings.

It has been contended that the Court of Chancery has no power,
by a summary proceeding, to compel a purchaser at a trustee's
sale, made under the authority of its decree, to complete his pur-
chase by enforcing the payment of the purchase money. This ob-
jection, it is conceived, cannot be available in the case now under
consideration. The trustee did not take either notes or bonds for
the payment of the purchase money, upon which a suit or suits at
law could have been instituted, but relied solely upon the liability
of the purchaser arising from the contract of sale, which was not
binding upon either party until ratified by the * Chancellor;
659 but when ratified, it was his duty to pay the purchase
money, or shew good cause to the contrary. Neither of which has
he done in the present case; for neither the allegation of the trus-
tee's inability to comply with the terms of the sale, nor that the
property, being in the possession of a third person, the trustee was
unable to deliver him possession, is supported by a shadow of
proof.

Had the Chancellor, therefore, under the circumstances of this
case, a right to adopt the proceeding to which he resorted to com-
pel the payment of the purchase money ? We think he had. The
order of the Chancellor was, that Samuel Anderson, the purchaser,
should pay the money to the trustee, or bring the same into Court
on a particular day, or shew good cause to the contrary. Under
the terms of this order, it is not perceived why Aaderson could
not have made as full a defence, and have availed himself of all
the objections which could have been relied upon in case an origi-
nal bill had been filed against him to enforce the same object.
Upon application to the Chancellor, setting forth that testimony
would be essential to his defence, on the hearing of the order, the
Chancellor would have passed an order to enable him to obtain it,
upon the return of which a full hearing of the merits of the case
might have been had; and if equity and justice required it, he
would and ought to have been discharged from his purchase.
That the Court of Chancery in England has the power of com-
pelling a purchaser to pay his purchase money after the confir-
mation of the sale, by an order for that purpose, is not to be
doubted. Lansdown v. Elderton, 14 Ves. 512; Newland Ch. Pr.
336. In Brasher's Exrs. v. Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch. Rep. 506-7, it
appears, that by the practice of the Court of Chancery, in New