622 ANDREWS v. SCOTTON—2 BLAND

Baltimore v. Howard, 6 H. & J. 394. And consequently, the tak-
ing of bonds or notes with or without surety, of a purchaser under
a decree, cannot, in any case, be construed as an abandonment of
the right to proceed against the purchaser alone by attachment, to
enforce the payment of the purchase money, after it has become
due, and after the sale has been ratified.

But if the parties choose, as they may, to have the bonds or
notes which have been taken of the purchaser, assigned to them
in satisfaction of their claims, that have been established; Spur-
rier v. Spurrier, 1 Bland, 476, note: Ex parte Boone, ante, 321, note;
McMullen v. Burris, ante, 357, note; Christie v. Hammond, ante, 645,
note; 1785. ch. 72, s. 9; or to have the trustee directed to proceed
against the purchaser and his sureties, in order to fix their liability
by a judgment at law, and in that way to recover the purchase
money, suits may be brought upon the bonds or notes by the as-
signee or the trustee, according to the uniform and long estab-
lished course, where such has been the choice and object of the
parties. Collinridge v. Mount, 2 Dick, 688: Musgrave v. Medcx, 1
Merit: 49.

It is a clear and well settled principle of this Court, that where
property has been sold under its decree, the Court, as the vendor
for the benefit of those interested, retains an equitable lien for the
payment of the purchase money. Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves.
329; Cowell v. Simpson, 16 Ves. 276. The most usual way of en-
forcing this lien, has been by petition of a party interested, set-
ting forth the facts, and praying that the property may be re-sold
to pay the whole or the balance of the purchase money. And a sale
may be ordered accordingly, at the risk of the delinquent pur-
chaser. The proceedings, in such eases, are almost always infor-
mal* and summary. Haig v. Commissioners Confiscated

657 Estates, 1 Desau. 144. The vendor undera decree, therefore,
holds two securities for the payment of the purchase money; one
is this equitable lieu, and the other is the personal liability .of the
purchaser. It is conceded on all hands, that the equitable lien
may be enforced in a summary way. Can there then be any con-
ceivable solid reason, why the personal liability should not also be
enforced in a summary way ? If it could not, there would be a
gross incongruity in the rules of the Court. But it is not so; the
personal liability may be enforced in a summary way, and there is
a perfect harmony in the rules and principles of the Court.

Upon the whole, it is my opinion, that the purchase money of
property sold under a decree, after the sale has been ratified, may
be recovered either by an order and process of attachment of con-
tempt against the purchaser himself, to compel him to complete
his purchase after the purchase money has become due; or by a
re-sale of the property, grounded on the subsisting equitable lien;
or by an action at law against the purchaser and his sureties, upon