620 ANDREWS v. SCOTTON.—2 BLAND.

with its own order. The action must then be grounded upon an
order of this Court, and instituted in the name of its agent. It
would be as if one Court were to bring suit upon its own judg-
ment* in another Court. Could such an action be sus-
654 tained ? I conceive it could not.

Chancellor HANSON, in an order of the 2nd of May, 1803, in
speaking of a contract between suing creditors about a dividend
of the proceeds of their deceased debtor's estate, says, "he had
never thought it necessary in case of any disputed claim to send
out an issue, or to refer the party to an action at !aw. Indeed, it
would be difficult, in most cases, to ascertain the proper parties for
an issue. The executor or administrator surely would not be com-
pelled, without being a party, to act as defendant on the trial of
the issue. However, in all cases where a claim depends on a
single fact or facts strongly litigated, and of difficult investigation,
the Chancellor conceives, that in some manner an issue ought to
be tried." Ringgold v. Jones, 1 Bland, 89, note. The Chancellor
may control the parties to the suit in equity, so as to compel them
to submit to the trial of an issue at law in any form he may dic-
tate. But, if a purchaser cannot be proceeded against here, he
certainly cannot be controlled at law. 2 Mad. Chan. 474; 1 Newl.
Chan. Pra. 350. Upon the whole it is clear, that there can be no
remedy against a purchaser at law independently of his bonds.

It seems to be an opinion of some, that there was a distinction
between sales for ready money, and sales on credit, where bonds
or notes were given for the purchase money. But as regards the
purchaser, it is difficult to conceive how his liability, and the na-
ture of his obligation can be substantially varied by the single
circumstance of the purchase money having been made payable on
the day of the ratification of the sale, or one day, or one mouth,
or one year after the day. Ex parte Cranmer, 2 Collinson on Idiots,
705.

When the term of the credit has expired, and the purchase
money is actually due and demandable, it would seem necessarily
to follow, that the payment might be enforced, as in all other cases,
by any form of legal or equitable proceeding, by which, compli-
ance, with such a contract, might be enforced. And, that if the
process of attachment might have been used to enforce a compli-
ance, if payment had been stipulated to be made on the day of
the ratification, it certainly might be used for the same purpose, at
any time after, when the money became due; because such a mode
of proceeding grows out of, and is incident to the nature of the
contract between the Court and the purchaser, and cannot be af-
655 fected * by any stipulation as to the mere time of payment.
It is a mode of proceeding, necessarily incident to such a
contract; because every particular of it, is a matter of record; and
that too. in a Court peculiarly fitted and competent to relief against