606 ANDREWS v. SCOTTON—2 BLAND.

dent, that considered the bidder or purchaser as a contracting
party, on the one side, dealing with the Court as the contracting
party on the other, and who was, in feet, the vendor. That the
Court was to be considered as the proprietor and principal, and

expected; that the land was sold entire; that if sold in parcels it would
have commanded more money; and that the signers wished and intended to
become purchasers, provided the land had been laid off in parcels so as to
suit them. The said petition also contained expressions highly injurious to
the characters of the trustees and the purchaser; and at the same time
plainly declared, that the petitioners would apply for legislative aid, unless
the Chancellor would set aside the sale as fraudulent and villainous.

Although the petition came in so questionable a way, and was so insulting
to the Chancellor, calculated as it plainly appeared, to intimidate him from
the free exercise of his own judgment, and to control even his conscience;
although he considered it as an attempt eventually to interrupt or defile the
pure stream of justice, he sent the petition, such as it was, to the Chancery
office, to be there filed, and to stand as an objection to the sale.

It has always been his practice, when an objection is made to a sale, to
wait until the day appointed by his conditional order of ratification; and
upon application, on or after that day, to appoint a time for hearing the ob-
jection, if any there be made. No application has been since made by any
of the signers of the petition, or by any person in their behalf.

But on this day an application has been made by the trustees, on their own
account, and in behalf of the purchaser; and the Chancellor thereupon pro-
ceeded to an examination of all the papers, in order that he might determine
on what is proper to be done. Amongst these papers he finds several instru-
ments of writing, by which a considerable number (about one-half) of the
persons whose names are subscribed to the petition, have prayed, in effect,
that they may not be considered as petitioners against the sale. Not one of
the others has come forward, either in person or by a solicitor or agent, or
by writing, to support the petition. On the other hand, the party most in-
terested in the sale has filed a petition, stating that the sale has been with
his perfect approbation; and most powerful reasons are assigned by him
wherefore it was so approved.

But let it be considered who are the persons in contemplation, of either
law or equity, interested in the sale. Not surely a person who was neither
the mortgagor nor a mortgagee, nor claiming under either mortgagor or
mortgagee, nor claiming under the State of Maryland. Not surely the man
who conceives himself interested merely because he wished to become a pur-
chaser, and who was disappointed because the land was not laid off in such
parcels as to suit his convenience. In short, it was only a mortgagee, or the
State, which was truly interested in the sale. One mortgagee, and the prin-
cipal one, as aforesaid, has expressed entire approbation. No objection has
been made on the part of the State, or of any other truly interested person,
although notice has been duly given. And upon the whole, the Chancellor
perceives no reason wherefore the sale should not be immediately ratified;
protesting however, contrary to a point made by the trustee, that if a rea-
sonable objection had appeared, he would have considered it as immaterial
by whom made. Having the control of sales, he deems it his duty to avail
himself of any information whatever, and never, knowingly, will he ratify
a fraudulent, unfair, or unreasonable sale. He will, however, always make
a distinction between volunteer objectors and objectors who are truly in-