534 HELMS v. FRANCISCUS.— 2 BLAND.

person; and in contemplation of law, the wife is considered as
having scarcely any separate existence. The husband is the head,
and therefore all the property of the wife belongs to him. This
peculiar compact is of so lasting a character, that this Court recog-
nizes no power in the parties to vary the rights and duties growing
out of it, or to effect, at their pleasure, any partial, much less a
total dissolution of it during their lives; it is one by which the
parties impose duties ou themselves, and engage to perform duties
with respect to their offspring; duties which are as much imposed
for the sake of public policy as of private happiness; and which,
therefore, they are never permitted to cast off at their pleasure.
From these general principles it follows, that husband and wife are
in competent to con tract with each other for the purpose of binding,
or conveying property in any manner, directly from one to the
other. And. having an inviolable right to the aid. comfort, and
society of each other, they cannot separate or have any mere
agreement between themselves for a separation, enforced by a
Court of common law or equity. Co. Litt. 112; Head v. Head, 3
Atk. 550; Worrall v. Jacob, 3 Meriv. 208; Westmeath v. West-
meath, 4 Cond. Chart. Rep. 60.

But, although it is, in. general, true, that husband and wife can-
not, of their mere motion, dissolve the marriage contract, yet
Courts of law and of equity, without pretending to any authority
either to sanction or enforce cohabitation or separation, will pro-
tect either party from the personal violence, or gross moral offence
of the other; and, for that purpose, allow of, and even enforce a
separation. This, however, is always done from necessity, and
with a view to preserve the public, peace, or to prevent the open
contamination of the morals of society; as where a husband, in-
dulging in a base, unmanly temper, was in the habit of beating his
wife, or, with brutish feelings, introduced lewd women with her
into his household. This pro tanto separation is not, however, an
impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded
as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger
policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such
*a separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the
562 public peace and morals may be so considered, it does not,
in any respect whatever, impair the marriage contract, or for any
purpose, place the wife in the situation of a feme sole. Lister's
Case, 8 Mod. 22; Rex v. Mead, 1 Burr. 542; Whorewood, v. Whore-
wood, 1 Cha. Ca. 250: Williams v. Callow, 2 Vern. 752; Head v.
Head, 3 Atk. 548; St. John v. St. John, 11 Ves. 529; Wellesley v.
Beaufort, 3 Cond. Chan. Rep. 1; Westmeath v. Westmeath, 4 Cond.
Chart. Rep. 55. (d)

(d) The having obtained a writ of supplicavit, is no reason that the wife
should elope, or be separated from her husband, for it is a security takea for