WATKINS v. WORTHINGTON.—2 BLAND. 515

A release, provisional or final, under the bankrupt or insolvent
laws, furnishes at least, prima facie evidence of this condition of
insolvency which gives to the creditor a right to demand satisfac-
tion from the estate of the surety; and to one surety to claim con-
tribution from his co-surety. It has been said, however, that in
the absence of such proof as this, the creditor must shew, that he
has brought suit against the principal, and has been unable, by
execution, to extract satisfaction from him. The return of nulla
bona, however, to a fieri facias, proves no more than that the
sheriff, if he has done his duty, has been unable to find any prop-
erty of the defendant within his county; and yet the defendant
may be wealthy, and have a large amount of property elsewhere;
or of a kind not within reach of the fieri facias. Goodall v. Stuart,
2 Hen. & Mun. 105. But if proof of this description were required,
then, as it is of a kind which the creditor can only put together
and create by due course of law, it would seem to follow as a
necessary consequence, that he should be allowed time thus to
fabricate it. If so, it would be enough, at least, for this purpose,
that he should bring his suit before his claim had been barred by
the Statute of Limitations; and that may be when he files his claim
in this Court. They may be, and often are, many creditors whose
claims are founded on joint and several obligations; and which
will, therefore, require some proof. Now, if the final distribution
of the deceased's estate were to be suspended until full proof of
this kind, by judgment and execution, could be fabricated; the
delays might be almost interminable. Proof of this description,
however, where it actually exists, shewing a failure to obtain sat-
isfaction by an execution, running over a county where the debtor
resides, or within which, if at all, he must be presumed to have
some property, may be received as sufficient prima, facie evidence
of insolvency, to found the creditor's claim upon the deceased's
estate; but such proof never has been, nor ever ought to be held
to be indispensably necessary. Spurrier v. Spurrier, 1 Bland,
476.

In the great majority of cases it would be impracticable, or ex-
ceedingly tedious and expensive to procure any other proof of in-
solvency, than that of general reputation in that part of the coun-
try where the debtor resides, and is known. Where the debtor
was a merchant, proof of his having suffered his notes to be pro-
tested for non-payment, with other circumstances, have been
deemed sufficient. As where it was proved, that the maker of the
note was in bad circumstances, and was supposed and reputed to
be insolvent; and that he had left his usual place of residence
sometime before, and had not returned to it; such proof was con-
sidered as sufficient evidence of a known insolvency. And so in
this Court, proof of insolvency by general reputation, has been
deemed sufficient. But in a creditor's suit,: it has been held to be