WATKINS v. WORTHINGTON.—2 BLAND. 513

upon the rights and interests of creditors. Yet as it appears that
they have been steadily continued in full force for more than thirty
years past, and as I found them firmly rooted and in full vigor
when I came here, I shall therefore continue to acquiesce under
their operation, leaving it to other and higher authority to correct
the evil, if it should be so considered, in such manner as may be
deemed most proper.

*Two of these excepting creditors, however, contend that
although these principles of this Court may be established. 538
they do not apply to their cases as the holders of promissory notes
which had been endorsed by the deceased, because every endorser
of such an instrument being considered as an original maker or
acceptor, and chargeable as such, he is not merely a surety, but
must be treated as an original debtor for the whole amount. This
is certainly the law in relation to such a contract; but it is not the
whole law as regards the matter under consideration.

The holder of a promissory note, or bill of exchange, which has
come to his hands through several endorsements, has a double se-
curity; and it is a rule of law and equity, that a man may make
use of all the securities he has, until he receives satisfaction for
his whole debt. And, therefore, as to the holder, the maker, ac-
ceptor, drawer, and each endorser is, as a distinct debtor, liable
for the whole amount, and each one may be sued separately as
such, at the same time; but the Court will not allow the holder to
obtain more than one entire satisfaction. It is clear, that as re-
gards the holder, they all stand as principal debtors; but, in point
of fact and law, the several endorsers are warranters of the note or
bill, and although they may not be strictly sureties, Ex parte
Yonge, 3 Ves. & Bea,, 39, who stand in relation to each other of
co-obligors in a joint and several bond, entitled to contribution
from each other on the failure of their principal; yet they are, in
truth, sureties standing as a series of guarantees, all of whom
pledge themselves for the sufficiency of the maker or acceptor, and
each one responsible for all who stand before him. The primary
liability resting upon the maker or acceptor, and the drawer and
each endorser liable only in a secondary degree. Considered as
sureties to this extent, and in this order, all the doctrine respect-
ing principal and surety applies to their relative situation, except
as regards contribution; in place of which, each endorser, on tak-
ing up the note or bill, has a right to stand as a creditor against
every one before him as his debtor to the full amount of the note
or bill; but a prior endorser can have no claim upon a subsequent
endorser. Ex parte Wyldman, 2 Ves. 115; Ex parte Marshal, 1 Atk.
130; Tindal v. Brown, 1 T. E. 167; Smith v. Woodcock, 4 T. K. 691;
Stock v. Mawson, I Bos. & Pul. 28C; Walwyn v. St. Quintin, 1 Bos.
& Pul, 652; English v. Darley, 2 JBos. & Pul. 61; Clarke v. Devlin,

33 2B.