510 WATKINS v. WORTHINGTON.—2 BLAND.

or surety, or co-surety; and then, unless he also proves, that the
co-surety or principal debtor, is insolvent, directly contrary to the
principles which prevail in bankruptcy, pushes the creditor par-
tially or entirely away from that portion of his security by which
the deceased's estate might have been made liable. Ex parte
Kendall, 17 Ves. 519.

The doctrines of bankruptcy sustains the obligations of the cre-
ditor's contract in all its bearings; the principles of this Court
strike off a large proportion of its force on the very eve of fruition,
and at the moment when the means of a full or partial satisfaction
are shown to be immediately at hand. It is evident, therefore,
that nothing1 can be found to sustain these principles of this Court
in any of the rules applicable to cases of bankruptcy.

It miglit- perhaps, have been urged, that the peculiar circum-
stances under which the rights of a creditor, and the liabilities of
his debtor are presented in a creditor's suit, calling for the admin-
istration of the real assets of such deceased debtor, render it
necessary to depart from those rules so clearly applicable in a
different state of things, and require the adoption of these princi-
ples of this Court, in order to do equal justice, to all whose interests
have been brought into conflict by the death of the debtor.

It is certain, however, that the mere act of God, as the death of
the debtor, does not change the rights of the creditor; nor can
they be affected by any change, from that cause, in the mental
*capacity of the debtor, as by his becoming a lunatic.
535 Own v. Davies, 1 Ves. 82. And it is also .settled, that no
alteration in the civil, political, or pecuniary condition of the
debtor can authorize a Court of justice to fetter or abolish any of
the creditor's remedies arising out of the personal liability of his
debtor, either by confining the creditor to a particular fund; or
altogether to the person of the debtor; or by compelling him to
seek satisfaction of any one alone, where two or more have been
made liable by the nature of the contract. Jennings v. Elster, 7
Cond. Cha. Rep. 115; Wilkinson v. Henderson, 1 Cond. Oka.
Rep. 173.

As where, in England, the debtor had been attainted of felony,
whereby all his property had become forfeited; or where he had
become a bankrupt, without a certificate, and had his whole estate
put into the hands of his assignees; or where by a special Act of
the Legislature all his estate had been vested in trustees for par-
ticular purposes; or where the estate of a British subject had, by
an Act of Assembly of one of the States of our Union, been confis-
cated; such circumstances were not allowed, in any manner, to
impair the obligation of the contract, to diminish the rights of the
creditor, or to lessen the liability of the debtor, even although it
should clearly appear, that the surety could not have the security
assigned to him; or that it would be impossible for him to take