504 WATKINS v. WORTHINGTON— 2 BLAND.

or chose in action, as a conditional payment, where, by the terms
of the contract, the creditor is bound to use due diligence, in order
to make the means of satisfaction, so placed in his hands, avail-
able; or excuse himself by shewing, that the pawn has been found
insufficient, or that the debtors bound by such assigned chose in
action, are insolvent, and that he has actually returned, or is, and
has always been able and ready to return the chow in action so
assigned. It cannot be denied, that the. principles of the Court so
far as they have a direct bearing upon such cases as these, are
sustain able by the clearest reason and equity: and indeed, have
been enforced in Courts of common law as well as in this Court.
Kenrslake v. Morgan, 5 T. R. 513: Chirk v. Young, 1 Cran, 181;
Harris v. Johnston, 3 Crant. 311; Powel Mort. 1083; Hoffman v.
Johnston, 1 Bland, 103; Dorsey v. Cfiinpbcll, 1 Bland, 356.

*This third position, taken in support of the principles of
528 this Court, rests upon tlje general doctrine in relation to
principal debtor and surety. It is alleged, that the creditor must
be excluded from any participation in the deceased's estate; be-
cause he had it in lii-s power to recover his whole claim, or a due
proportion of it, front the principal debtor, or the other sureties;
or because he is chargeable with some injurious negligence as re-
gards the deceased debtor, whose estate the Court is then about
to distribute. And assuming these allegations to be true, until
the contrary is shewn, the Court calls upon the creditor to explain
the transaction, and to shew which of the obligors is the principal,
and which the surety.

In the common case of a money bond, there is no distinction
upon the face of it, between the principal and surety; nor is it
necessary to be shewn iu any suit upon such a bond, who is prin-
cipal and who is surety; except for the purpose of administering
the equities that arise between the principal and sureties. Such
an instrument shews only, that the creditor has parted with his
property, or lent his money on a security, by which two persons are
jointly and severally bound to him. The contract is legal and fair;
and therefore, as to him, they are both principal debtors; though
with respect to each other, they may stand in the relation of prin-
cipal and surety. Of the interests or motives between them, the
creditor has, or need have no knowledge. All he looked to was a
security, by which two persons were equally and jointly bound to
him; and that his security had an admitted legal obligatory force
fully to that extent. And if the bond were joint only, still as
against other creditors even, and in the administration of assets,
it would be allowed to have the effect of a several bond. Burn v.
Burn, 3 Vex, 574; Just. Inst. by Coop. 613. Yet, according to these
principles of this Court, the creditor must not only know which of
the obligors is the principal debtor, aud which the surety, but may
have the burthen cast upon him of developing by proof, the latent