WATKINS v. WORTHINGTON.—2 BLAND. 497

descent. 1729, eh. 24, s. Hi. Hence it appears, that in all cases
where an infant, who takes by purchase, might have had the privi-
lege of causing the parol to demur, had he taken by descent, the
like privilege shall be extended to him for the protection of the in-
heritance held by him as a purchaser. And it was also the prac-
tice of the land * office, under the Provincial government,
to let everything stand in which an infant was concerned, 520
until he attained his full age. Land Hol. Ass. 145.

But in equity it is, in some respects, otherwise, The interests
of an infant are so far taken care of, that no decree will be made
against him, without allowing him to show cause after he comes of
age; and the Court never pretends to change the nature of an in-
fant's estate, or make that absolute which was defeasable, or to
shield an infant, or his property, from any just stipulation1 or legal
liability which had been fairly incurred in a regular course of law.
Co. Lift. 240; Whittingham's Case,8 Co. 84; Anonymous, 2 Cha. Ca.
163; Cary v. Bertie, 2 Vern. 342. In all cases where the debtor,
by his will, charges his real estate with the payment of his debts,
any creditor may, in behalf of himself and the other creditors of
the testator, by a bill against the executor, devisee, and heir, on
establishing his claim, and the insufficiency of the personalty,
have the real estate immediately sold for the payment of the debts
notwithstanding the infancy of the heir; because such a devise
breaks the descent, or because the real estate is considered as hav-
ing descended to the heir as a mere trustee for the benefit of the
creditors of the testator. Cooke v. Parsons, 2 Vern. 429; Newton
v. Sennet, 1 Ero. C. C. 137; Williams v. Whingates, 2 Bro. C. C,
399; Skipkard v. Lutwidge, 8 Ves. 29; Birch v. Glover, 4 Mad, 876.
But where the real estate has not been so charged by the debtor;
and has been suffered to descend to his heir, in such case the parol
demurred in equity as at common law: and there could be no
decree for a sale until the heir attained his full age, Chaplin v.
Chaplin, 3 P. Will. 368; Uvedale v. Uvedale, 3 Atk. 117; Powell v.
Robins, 1 Fes. 209; Lechmere v. Timber, 2 Jac. & Wal. 290; Brook-
field v. Bradley, 4 Cond. CM. Rep. 297.

The disability of a feme covert is also regarded with kind atten-
tion by a Court of equity, and her interests are carefully protected.
Yet she has never been indulged with any such privilege as that
of having the proceedings suspended, or of having a day allowed
her to show cause after she became sole, as is granted to an infant;
but if the plaintiff establishes his ease, he has a right to demand
an absolute decree against her and her estate. Madlack v. Gallon,
3 P. Will. 352; Powel Mot'tg. 986.

At common Jaw, as in equity, a person non compos mentis may

be sued, and a judgment or decree obtained against him; he may

be arrested and held to bail, or imprisoned for want of bail; but

in equity, although he must himself be made a party, yet the

32 2 B.