MURDOCK'S CASE.—2 BLAND. 463

belonging Co Gilbert Murdock, with his permission, and finding a
few panels of the fence down, at the place spoken *of, they
put them up to keep the sheep in the field. They disclaimed- 486
all right and title whatever to the field or place where they put up
the fence, and aver that they acted in total ignorance of what

ing the said Edward one-half-of the profits; and that the said Samuel be
further enjoined Dot to change, or stop up. or obstruct the passage of any
road, on either side of the river leading to the said ferry, without the con-
sent of the said Edward; but that all access, as heretofore, shall be allowed
by the said Samuel, to every person, carriage, horse or other animal, or
thing coming to the said ferry, or which would come to it, in case there was
no obstruction. And in case the said Samuel shall refuse, neglect, or delay
to carry on a ferry jointly with the said Edward, at the place where the
ferry aforesaid, first mentioned in the bill, was carried on and the said Ed-
ward shall think proper to carry on the same for their joint benefit, he, the
said Samuel, is hereby enjoined not to carry on without the said Edward's
consent, any ferry which shall interfere with, or take custom from the ferry
carried on at the said place. And in case the said Edward, on the said
Samuel's refusal, neglecting or delaying as aforesaid, shall actually set up
and carry on a ferry at the place aforesaid, he shall pay weekly to the said
Samuel, one-half of the profits thereof, after deducting the expense in-
curred in so setting up and carrying on. And it is further Decreed, that the
defendant pay unto the complainant, the costs by him expended, in the
prosecution of his suit, amounting as taxed by the register, to the quantity
of 18,320 pounds of tobacco.

On the fullest consideration of all the circumstances of this case, and of
the principles established in this Court, the Chancellor has. at length, passed
a decree, which, independent of the consent of the parties, and of another
tribunal, must be final. After much anxious thought he has satisfied his
own judgment and conscience. His feelings will be much gratified if the
parties shall be satisfied, that he has done neither more nor less than his duty
required; but it appeared to him possible, without their consent, to place
them precisely in the situation contemplated by their agreement. It has
hitherto been his practice to consult, as far as possible, consistently with
justice, the welfare of every person who has come before him; and therefore
he has not unfrequently proposed to settle a controversy, and to save much
further vexation and expense by a decree or consent. Whatever may be
the prospect of success, he cannot forbear suggesting to the present parties
an accommodation on such terms, as he conceives an enlightened arbitrator
who should be equally a friend to justice, and to each of them, would pre-
scribe. It is evident, that without a good understanding between them, the
ferry cannot advantageously be carried on; and it must remain a constant
subject of contention, supposing evea that the foregoing decree is to stand.
But in their causes there is a variety of difficult points: what will be the de-
cision of the Court of Appeals is uncertain; and if, in the course of their
lives, an end can be put to their controversies, neither can possibly so far
succeed as to have been a gainer by it. He is certain then, that neither can
be a loser by acceding to his proposal. Actuated by the principles of hu-
manity, and partial to neither, he flatters himself, that neither can reasonably
be offended by a proposition, which, he conceives, will appear reasonable to
the friends of both, and to every unprejudiced, disinterested person. On
the evidence in the cause, together with the information he has otherwise