MURDOCK'S CASE.—2 BLAND. 451

The defendant answered the bill, and denied the right of the
plaintiff to the land of which the fence, or any part of it, had

monthly profits of the ferry amounted to £35 or £40, to one-half of which
the plaintiff was entitled.

Whereupon it was prayed, that the defendant might be compelled to exe-
cute deeds of partition, according to the terms of the said division; that the
defendant be ordered to account for the rents and profits of the ferry; that
the plaintiff might be quieted in the possession and enjoyment of his half-
part thereof; and that he might have such further and other relief as the
nature of his case might require; and that a writ of injunction might be
granted, directed to the defendant, "commanding him to stay, surcease, and
forbear from molesting or disturbing the plaintiff, in the peaceable posses-
sion and quiet enjoyment of one moiety and half part of the said ferry and
ferry-house situate on the said land, called United Friendship, lying in
Baltimore County, and the appendages to the same belonging: and also in-
joining and prohibiting him from preventing the plaintiff from receiving his
half part of the profits of the said ferry, called Patapsco Upper Ferry,
weekly and every week, according to the agreement between the parties
aforesaid, till the Court should take further order in the premises."

HANSON, C., 11th May, 1796.—The Chancellor has examined this bill. It
appears to him, that an injunction granted on filing a bill, and before hear-
ing of the defendant, never does and never ought to go further than to pro-
hibit the defendant from doing something which appears, from the statement
of the bill, to be against equity and good conscience, and prejudicial to the
rights of the complainant, for instance, to stay waste or proceedings at law.
&c. &c. that is, to suspend the defendant, &e. An injunction directing the
defendant to put the complainant into possession of a benefit, or what is
stated to be his right, is never to he granted, as the Chancellor conceives,
until a final hearing of the whole merits of the cause, unless in the case of
a right established by record. The statement of the bill is imperfect; but
the Chancellor supposes, from the nature of the application, that the conduct
of the ferry, and the possession thereof, is in the defendant. If so, the in-
junction prayed is, in effect, to direct the defendant to settle weekly with
the complainant, and pay him one-half of the profits, which indeed are, and
must be, uncertain; that is to say, the injunction is to put the complainant
into possession of a benefit. The complainant does riot pray that the de-
fendant be prohibited from carrying on the ferry, &c. &c. If the conduct
of the ferry be in the hands of the complainant, he needs the aid of this
Court as prayed. In short, it appears to the Chancellor that he cannot, with
propriety, grant the injunction on the bare statement of the complainant
and his vouchers, considered ex parte. Whether or not an injunction may
be granted or decreed, on the final hearing, is a question which may here-
after be determined.

The next day the bill was, with some suggestions and references, again
submitted to the Chancellor for reconsideration.

HANSON, C., 12th May, 1796.—The Chancellor has again considered this
case. He finds that an injunction has been granted by Chancellor ROGERS.
in case of Dallam v. Onion. The principle on which it was there granted,
must apply to the present ease; and although the Chancellor is satisfied
that, in a case like the present, an injunction was never granted in