MURDOCK'S CASE.—2 BLAND. 430

since the defendant thereby not merely obtains time to deliberate
before he makes answer, but has its deficiency, after it has been
made, particularly pointed out. and is thereupon allowed farther
time to supply its defects. And, therefore, after the expiration of
the time allowed by such an order, if a good and sufficient answer
be not put in, the plaintiff may well have his bill taken pro confesiso
without further delay, and a final decree made thereupon accord-
ingly. Denny . Filmer. Nelson. 65; Ogilvie v. Herne, 13 Ves. 060;
Landon v. Ready, I Cond. Cha. Rep. 23.

If a plaintiff could not be allowed, in this manner, either to have
the defendant attached and compelled to answer, or to have his
bill taken pro confesso, as if no answer at all had been filed, then
those legislative provisions, by which the proceedings against a
defendant to obtain an answer, or have the bill taken pro confesso
have been regulated might be continually evaded or rendered alto-
gether nugatory. It would only be necessary, in any case, for the
defendant to file a mere sham answer, with the express view to its
being declared insufficient, so as to throw the plaintiff back upon
and force him to resort to, and again run out the same Hue of
process up to that at wliich he had left off. Such a course, it is
evident, would be in direct opposition to the spirit, if not to
the letter, of those legislative enactments, the clear principles of
which may be so aptly applied to all cases situated like the
present. Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that this
plaintiff may now have his bill taken pro confesso for want of an
answer, and have a final and absolute decree founded upon that
default and tacit confession.

Whereupon, it is Decreed, that the said bill of complaint be
* taken pro confesso; that the said several deeds and con- 461
veyances from the said Jasper Peddicord to the said
Jeremiah Barthellow, and to the said Asbury Peddicord, in the
bill mentioned, be.and the same are hereby declared to be fraudu-
lent and utterly void as against the said plaintiff; that the property
be sold; that Thomas S. Alexander be the trustee to make the
said sale, &c.

MURDOCH'S CASE.

INJUNCTION TO STAY WASTE.—SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER.—CHANCERY SALES.—

BREACH OF INJUNCTION.—MANDATORY INJUNCTION.

An injunction to stay waste granted to a mortgagee, before the mortgage

debt became due. (a)

A defendant may be permitted, by a supplemental answer, to explain
equivocal expressions used in his first answer, leaving the first answer
to stand. (6} ___

(a) See Salmon v. Clagett, 3 Bland, 135, note.

(b) See McKim v. Thompson, I Bland. 150, note (b).