JONES v. STOCKETT.—2 BLAND. 413

by having a legacy given to himself, and also in consideration of
a large legacy given to his child, consents that her maintainance
and education shall be given up to the management- of trustees.
Lyons v. Blenkin, 4 Cond. Cha. Rep. 124.

But, although it may be admitted that this jurisdiction of the
Court of Chancery, as between parent and child, has been substan-
tially established, yet it cannot be denied that there are many
cases in which it would be exceedingly difficult to exercise such
authority successfully, and with real advantage to the infant. 2
Lond. Jurist, 60.

In the ease under consideration there is no evidence whatever of
any vicious habits, or improper treatment of the father towards
the legatee, or any other of his children; nor does there appear to
have been any such great pecuniary difference made by this legacy
between this legatee and his father, as in any respect to call for a
check upon the parental authority for the benefit of the infant.
The father, we must presume, from the proofs, is an industrious
laboring citizen, with a large family about him; who has not the
means of bestowing any thing more than what is called a common
country school education upon any of them. His son Larkin, the

* legatee, has had given to him an estate in the nature of an
annuity for life, amounting to no more than $250 per annum; 432
from which alone, it is true, that he may be able to obtain a much
better education than his father can give him: yet his expectations
in life, from such an estate, cannot be presumed to rise so far
above those to which he might look as a member of his father's
family, as to suggest the propriety of his being brought up with
higher hopes, much less to justify any suppression of his father's
authority over him. Nevertheless, from the terms of this bequest,
which, beyond a specified expenditure, is to accumulate until the
legatee attains his full age, as well as from the principles of equity
by which this case must be governed, if the father refuses to permit
these trustees to have the management of his maintenance and edu-
cation, I can order nothing to be paid to him for those or any other
purposes. Jervoice v. Silk, Cooper's Rep. 52; Haley v. Bannister, 4
Mad. 275; Wellesley v. Beaufort, 3 Cond. Cha. Rep. 14. And as
the father has never, in any way, consented to part with his son,
in consideration of his being maintained and educated, as directed
by the testator, 1 cannot, on that ground, interfere with the con-
nection between him and his child. But to whatever school he
may be permitted to go, by his father, the trustees will be ordered
to pay all expenses, to the extent of the annual income of his
legacy, including maintenance for that purpose, if the school

should be deemed sufficient, and happens to be too distant for him
to reside with his father.

There seems to have been an understanding between these trus-
tees and the father of Larkin, the legatee, that he was at all