JONES v. STOCKETT—2 BLAND. 409

under this same will, claiming a legacy of a similar kind; and
which therefore, must, in so far as the two legacies are substan-
tially alike, be governed by the same directions that have been
given in relation to the legacy bequeathed to the plaintiff Ann.
But in regard to the legacy to the plaintiff Larkin other
questions have arisen, from his infancy and peculiar situation,
which call for other and further directions to the trustees as to the
disposition, in some respects, of the legatee himself as well as of
his legacy.

The directions of the testator are clear and explicit, "that my
said trustees shall have and retain the sole possession and custody
of the said estate so given as aforesaid to my said nephew Larkin
for the. purpose of educating him. and are to rent out the real
estate, and put out the money on interest to the best advantage;
and pay away the yearly proceeds after his arrival at age to him;
but to retain a control over the principal till the objects of this be-
quest and devise are fully complied with." Hence it is manifest,
that to these trustees alone have been confided the means of ac-
complishing the landable intentions of this testator.

Where a large legacy is given to an infant, and it vests in him
immediately, or ultimately at all events, it has been usual to allow
an adequate maintenance out of the property so given, and to
order it to be paid to the father for that purpose, if he should not
be of sufficient ability to maintain his child in a manner suitable
to the fortune so given. Buckworth v. Buckworth, 1 Cox, 80. But
in this case the bequest is special and peculiar. The probable or
possible misapplication by the father of the proceeds of the prop-
erty bequeathed to this infant, * seems to have been dis- 428
tinctly within the contemplation of the testator. For the
trustees are expressly directed to retain the sole possession of the
property for the purpose of educating the infant; and there is no
provision for his maintenance, except, as an indispensable means
of educating him; that is, while he may be at school, and not re-
siding with his father. The distinctly expressed intentions of the
testator are that the infant be educated; that so much of the
yearly proceeds of the property as may be necessary are to be
applied for that purpose; and that all over and above what may
be necessary to attain that object shall be put out on interest
to the best advantage, and paid to him after his arrival at age;
or, in other words, that if, from any cause, he cannot be educated
as desired, he shall have the money which might have been spent
in that way.

It is clear, that upon mere common law principles, and by means
of a writ of habeas corpus alone, the Chancellor, the Judges, or
the Courts of common law can do little more than relieve any
one from illegal restraint. Lyons v. Blenkin. 4 Cond. Cha. Rep.
120; Ex parte Skinner, 17 Com. Lair Sep. 122. The Chancellor,