HAMMOND v. HAMMOND.—2 BLAND. 369

brought into Court. Butler v. Duncomb, 1 P. Will. 453; Bickham
v. Cross, 2 Ves. 471; Perkyns v. Baynton, 1 Bro. C. C. 574: Creuze
v. Lowth, 4 Bro. C. C. 158, 318; Turner v. Turner, Jac. & Walk. 47;
Parker v. Mackall, ante, 08; Woodward v. Chapman, ante, 71; Sloss v.
McIlvane, ante, 73; Craig v. Baker, ante, 238. The rule for com-
puting interest, in all cases, where the debt carries interest; and
the debtor has made partial payments, is, that the interest is cal-
culated from the time the debt becomes payable, down to the day
of the first payment: and the interest is added to the principal,
then the payment is deducted from the whole; and if such payment
satisfies the whole interest and a part of the principal, then the inte-
rest is calculated upon the balance of the principal to the day of the
second payment, from the whole of which the second payment is de-
ducted, &c. But if the first payment does not discharge the whole
interest, then after applying it to the satisfaction of so much
of the interest, the interest is calculated upon the principal only,
until the day of the second payment, which is deducted from the
whole amount, and so on. So that in no way is any interest calcu-
lated and paid upon interest. Frazier v. Hyland, 1 H. & J. 98;
Gwinn v. Whitaker, 1 H. & J. 754.

But where the estate of the deceased, or insolvent debtor is in-
sufficient * to pay his debts; the personal credit having
ceased, and all hope, of obtaining payment, by the personal 384
exertions of the debtor, having come to an end, the estate, as in
cases of bankruptcy in England, is treated as a dead fund, as a
kind of shipwreck, in which there can only be a salvage of a part
to each creditor. Ex parte Ben-net, 2 Atk. 527. Under such circum-
stances, it has long been the practice of this Court, as the best
method of settling the proportions among the creditors, to have a
statement made by the auditor, of the aggregate amount of the
principal and interest of their respective claims, as of the day of
the sale of the real estate, which, when confirmed, operates as a
judgment in favor of each from that day. And, as, in all cases,
where the estate is sold on a credit, the purchase money is made
to bear interest from the day of sale; the aggregate amount, thus
found due to each creditor, is that amount upon which a propor-
tional dividend of the proceeds of the estate is to be awarded to
each, with a similar proportion of the interest which may be paid
on the purchase money. So that, where the creditors of an in-
sufficient estate, have been delayed by a sale for their satisfaction
on a credit, they may have the interest, on the dividends of their
respective claims, met and re-imbursed by the interest arising from
the purchase money of the estate sold. Jacob v. Suffolk, Moxely,
27; Neal v. The Attorney-General. Mosely, 247; Corrie v. Clarke, 1
Bland, 86, note; Dorscy v. Hammond, 1 Bland. 468; Tyson v. Ho/-
lingsworth, ante, 333; Pattison v. Frazier, ante, 372.

24 2 B.