364 HAMMOND v. HAMMOND.—2 BLAND

2 Fes. 471; De Tastet v. Rucker, 4 Exch. Rep. 156; on which costs,
as a separate claim, no interest would be allowed. 14 Vin. Abr.

are used. It is not, "I give Alexander one-half of my estate on condition,
that he lays out the sum of —— in the complete education and maintenance
of his brother, at some approved school." or, "I will, that the part of my
estate devised to Alexander be charged with the expense of providing a
good education to his brother, and likewise completely maintaining him at
some approved school." No! it is, "my will and desire is, that my son
Alexander do, out of his part of the estate, expend so much money as will
be sufficient to give my son John Alexander a good education." It is ap-
parent, from the whole will, setting aside this disputed part, that the testa-
tor contemplated perfect equality between his two sons; except, that he gave
Alexander, the eldest, choice of two equal parts, and makes him executor;
which is just what was reasonable, &c. Now, by changing the disposition of
the words, and putting "out of his part of the estate." at the end of the
clause, it stands perfectly consistent with that intended equality; and it is
well observed by the counsel, that transpositions are frequently made for
the purpose of supporting a rational construction of the whole. It may be
observed, that there are few men, who, in speaking or writing, do not ex-
press themselves in such a manner that, if you understand them according
to the strict rules of grammar, you make them speak contrary to their in-
tention.

It is alleged, without proof, that Alexander was burthened with the edu-
cation of his brother on account of his, the said Alexander's, having already
received a good education: and that by so charging him, equality was pre-
served. But it is not so. In such a case, the eldest son would be educated
at the charge of the whole estate, and the younger at the charge of the
elder's part. For illustration, suppose the whole estate to be £4.000: and
that £500 had been expended in educating Alexander more than had been
expended on John. To make them equal, it ought to be directed that £500
shall be expended on John, and the residue divided between them. In that
case, they will have been educated at equal expense, and the share of each
will be £1,750. But. according to the constiuctiou contended for, they will
have been educated at equal expense, and John will get £500 more than his
brother; that is, they each share £2.000 out of the £4,000. John has his
part clear; but £500 is taken from Alexander to educate and maintain John.
"When the contemplation of equality is so apparent: when an easy, obvious
transposition will support that equality; and when, without the transposi-
tion, such inequality takes place, it is impossible to admit the claimant's
construction of the will. "My will and desire is, that my son Alexander,
out of his part of the estate, shall expend so much money," &c.. as already
has been observed, is strange language to constitute a charge on Alexander's
part. "My will and desire," are words very significant; "to expend so
much money," are equally so. In short, the meaning of the whole clause
was; that Alexander, the executor, should be authorized to lay out as much
of John's part of the personal estate as would suffice to give him a liberal
education. Without this provision in the will, John's education might be
defective. The guardian, whom he might choose, or who might be appointed,
without the provision, might not think proper to expend so much money as
might suffice; particularly, if the annual profits should not correspond with
the proofs in the cause, or might happen, in some years, to fall short.

In addition to all this: supposing us compelled to take his for Alexander's,
it may be asked whether good education must comprehend maintenance; or