338 HAMMOND v. HAMMOND.— 2 BLAND.

heir or devisee. 1773, ch. 7. Thus, in effect, giving to the answer
of an infant, by his guardian, in all creditors' suit, and suits by
mortgagees, the force and operation of an adult defendant in so
far as to authorize the immediate sale of the realty without allow-
ing the parol to demur. Prutzman v. Pitesell, 3 H. & J. 80; Pue
v. Dorsey, 1 Bland, 139. note. By a subsequent legislative enact-
ment it was declared, that if any person should die without leav-
ing' personal estate sufficient to discharge the debts by him due,
and should leave real estate, the Chancellor, after summoning the
minor heir or devisee, and his appearance by guardian to be ap-
pointed for that purpose, and to answer and defend for him; and
on the justice of the claim of the creditor being fully established,
might order the real estate to be sold for the payment of the debts
due by the deceased. 1785. ch. 72, s. 5: Birch v. Glover, 4 Mad.
370. Thus virtually abolishing the infant's privilege of having
the parol to demur, and of shewing cause when he attained his
full age: and so placing it in the power of the Court of Chancery,
at once, to compel him to do justice to the creditors of his ancestor
or devisor, by divesting him of the privilege of alleging his minority
as a means of obstructing, for a time, the regular course of justice.
It having been thus put upon infant defendants, in such cases,
to defend their interests immediately, and as effectually as they
can, by a mere guardian ad litem, who has been expressly author-
ized to consent to an immediate sale of the real estate; the answer
of an infant by his guardian, in all such cases, must be taken to
be as conclusive against him as if he had answered as an adult.
Kent v. Taneyhill, 6 G. & J. 3. And as a creditor, who comes in
under a decree, may have his claim allowed upon affidavit, if it
be not expressly denied and contested; so a creditor suing as an
original plaintiff, may obtain a decree on a similar authentication
of his claim, unless it be expressly denied and put in issue by the
answer of an adult or infant defendant; otherwise a plaintiff cred-
itor would be made to encounter greater difficulties than one who
came iu under the decree. Hill v. Binney. 6 Ves. 738; Burroughs v.
Elton, 11 Ves. 36. Such has always been held to be the true con-
struction and necessary consequence of those legislative enact-
ments, for, if it were not so, they would have removed no obstruc-
tions, nor given to creditors any additional facilities whatever in
recovering satisfaction of their debts from the real estate of their
deceased debtor, in the hands of his infant heirs or devisees, (v)

(v) But, in regard to this privilege of infants, it may be well to recollect,
that, in some cases, it still exists; and that the paroi may demur in all cases
at common law and in equity, except where it has been otherwise provided
by the above-mentioned Acts of Assembly; by those Acts in relation to pro-
ceeding by publication, against absent infant defendants, and by the Act
which relates to infants who may be made parties to a suit which had abated
by death. In Virginia, it has been declared that the parol shall not demur