HAMMOND v. HAMMOND.—2 BLAND. 333

have the surplus, or the whole proceeds of sale; or the share to
which the deceased debtor may be entitled, and which then re-
mains subject to the control of the Court, applied in satisfaction
of bis debts; upon which all of the proceedings are taken together
as forming one creditor's suit, as to the whole, or the particular
share, and are so treated accordingly through all its subsequent
stages. Fenwick v. Laughlin, 1 Bland, 474; Gaither v. Welch, 3
G. & J. 264. The object of the secondary proceeding, in such in-
stances, being to intercept the assets, and prevent their misappli-
cation is, in effect, a prayer for relief against the proceedings in
the original suit; and is a kind of engraftment of a scion of a dif-
ferent species upon a then growing stock. Park. His. Co. Cha.
506.

* As to who may or must be made parties to a creditor's
suit, the general rale is, that all persons having an interest
in the object of the suit, ought to be made parties. But as this
rule results from a consideration of the advantage which all per-
sons must have in the entire settlement of the matter in litigation,
it is founded on convenience; and is therefore made to yield in
cases of necessity, or where it would be attended with any incon-
venience which may be safely avoided, upon the ground of there
being a common interest among creditors, which any one of them
may sufficiently represent, and to avoid the great inconvenience
of making all of them parties, any one has been allowed to file a
bill for himself, and in behalf of all others of his co-creditors. But
as regards the defendants to a creditor's suit, the general rule
would lead, in administering the assets of a deceased person, to
taking notice of his credits, and following his estate beyond his
personal representatives; and, consequently, to the bringing for-
ward of his debtors; yet the practice of the Court has prescribed
bounds to the inquiry; and accordingly the rule is to stop short at
the personal representatives of the deceased, unless the justice
due to the plaintiffs, or the peculiar circumstances of the case,
should require others to be called in. Holland v. Prior, 1 Cond.
Cha. Rep. 22.

The personal estate being the primary and natural fund for the
payment of debts, must be first resorted to, even for the satisfac-
tion of debts due to the State, as well as to individuals, so far as
it remains and can be found. Magna Charta, a. 18; Kilty' Rep.
305; 2 Inst.18 and 32; Evelyn v. Evelyn, 2 P. Will. 664, note; Mogg
v. Hodges. 2 Ves. 52; Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Ves. 518: 8. C. 1 Meriv.
220; The King v. Hopper, 1 Exche. Rep. 280; Brogden v. Walker,
2 H. & J. 294. (u) And if that estate be insufficient, there can,
with propriety, be no other person than the executor or adminis-
trator of the deceased, made defendant to a creditor's suit. But
if the bill alleges, or it can be shewn, that the deceased debtor left
no personal estate, or that it had been exhausted or wasted, or by