WELCH v. STEWART—2 BLAND. 33

the deed of trust, some of which claims are those which have been
assigned to the plaintiff Welch; that the late David Stew art died
seized and possessed of other property, not so specially appro-
priated; and that his whole estate, both real and personal, was
insufficient to pay his debts. The heirs, administrator and trustee,
who were all made defendants, by their answers, admitted the
truth of the allegations of the bill. Whereupon it was decreed,
that the estate be sold; that notice be given to the creditors of the
deceased to come in; and that the administrator account. The
property was accordingly sold. After which, on the 4th of De-
cember, 1828, Evans and others, filed their petition, stating that
they also were creditors of the deceased; and that they objected to
the allowance of certain claims of the plaintiff Welch.

The auditor, on the 4th of February, 1829, reported a statement
of the claims of the plaintiffs, and others who had come in as credi-
tors of the deceased. Evans and others excepted to the account
allowing the plaintiff Welch's claims, Nos. 1, 2 and 5; because
they had not been established by any evidence, as against them
and others, the creditors of the late David Stewart; and for these
reasons they, in like manner, objected to the allowance of the
* plaintiff Welch's claim No. 3; and also, because it was
not mentioned or demanded in the bill in any form what-
ever.

BLAND, C., 16th March, 1829.—The exceptions to the auditor's
report standing ready for hearing, and the solicitors of the
parties having been heard, the proceedings were read and con-
sidered.

I take it to be a well settled rule of this Court, that on a credi-
tor's bill, the decree for a sale, in the usual general terms, virtually
and necessarily establishes the claims of all the originally suing
creditors, unless some of them should, by the decree itself, be
specially excepted; since it is very clear, that no sale can be
ordered, but to pay some one or more debts which have been estab-
lished to the satisfaction of the Chancellor. Strike's Case, 1 Bland,
70; Williamson v. Wilson, 1 Bland, 441. But such a decree only
establishes the claim of the plaintiff as a debt due from the estate
of the deceased debtor, without prejudice to third persons, and
consequently, if any others, who may have been allowed to come
in as parties to the suit, can-shew fraud or any other circumstance
by which it shall appear that the debt, as so far established, ought
not to be permitted to stand in the way of their interests, it may
be then shewn and taken advantage of; because the introduction
and reliance upon any such new and collateral matter is not in any
way incompatible with an admission of the stability of any of those
points which had been previously adjudicated upon and determined
by the decree.

3 2B.