294 HAMMOND v. HAMMOND.—2 BLAND.
Mewburn. The bill states, that the late Philip Hammond made-
his will, on the 6th of August, 1822, and soon after died, seized
and possessed of a large real and personal estate; that by his will,
he gave particular portions of his estate to each of the parties to
this suit, upon the terms specified; that he emancipated some of
his slaves; that he directed certain parcels of his real estate to be
sold for the payment of his debts; and appointed his wife, the de-
fendant Elizabeth, with the defendant Eezin, and the plaintiffs
Charles and Thomas, his executors.
The only dispositions of this testator's will, that are, at all, mate-
rial to this controversy are the following, in which, among other
things, he says: "to my sou Charles Hammond, and his heirs for-
ever, I give and bequeath the following negroes, to wit, Andrew.
Diuah, and her daughter Amy," &c.; and again he says, "to my
daughter Harriet Hammond, and her heirs forever, I give and be-
queath the following negroes, to wit, Margaret and Rose." &c.
And he then concludes his will in these words. "I will and direct,
that all the residue of my lands in Anne Arundel County, which
have not been devised by me to my children, nor grandchildren,
be sold by my executors, and the moneys arising from the sales
thereof, be applied to the payment of my debts, and should there
be more than * will discharge my debts, then I give the sur-
308 plus that may be over, to iny wife Elizabeth Hammond; but in
case the moneys arising from the sales of said property should not
wrongful withholding of money. Webster v. Assurance Co. 18 Ch. D. 169;
In re Gosman, 17 Ch. D. 771. Interest is not allowable as a matter of law in
cases of tort, but its allowance rests in the discretion of the jury. Lincoln
v. Claflin, 7 Wallace, 132; Newsonv. Douglass, 7 H. & J. 418. Where inte-
rest is allowed as damages the rate must be according to the lex fori. God-
dard v. Foster, 17 Wallace, 124.
The lex loci contract us determines the rate of interest, unless the contract
is to be performed in another State, in which case the law of such State
governs. 3 Kent Com. 460; Costigan v. Sewell, 6 Gill, 332; Boyce v. Edwards,
4 Pet. 111 DeWolf v. Johnson, 10 Wheaton, 383. When at the place of con-
tract the rate of interest differs from that at the place of payment, the par-
ties may stipulate for either rate and the contract will govern. Cromwell v.
County of Sac, 96 U. S. 51.
In judgments at law the interest on the debt may be calculated down to
the date of the judgment, and the whole will then bear interest from that
date. But this is the effect of an express statutory provision, (Rev. Code,
Art. 64, see. 124,) which has never been extended to decrees in equity on
bills to account, where the account embraces charges of interest. In such
cases interest is computed by the auditor from the time the money became
due up to the time of stating the account, with interest on the principal sum
only from that time until paid. Rayner v. Bryson, 29 Md. 482.
Calculations of interest according to Eowlett's Tables are legalized by Rev.
Code. Art. 36, sec. 1. Duvall v. Farmers Bank, 7 G. & J. 45.
As to the allowance of interest against trustees, see Wayman v. Jones. 4
Md. Ch. 500.
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