264 CONTEE v. DAWSON.— 2 BLAND.

Considering this decision as resting upon this ground, that the-
testator and the Court imposed and enforced the forfeiture to pre-
vent and punish and fraudulent attempt to obtain a double or unjust
proportion of an estate, it will be found to accord in principle with
a legal provision which has received, for a length of time, the
reiterated approbation of the General Assembly of this State; be-
sides having had, in other countries, for ages past, the sanction of
a very large and enlightened portion of mankind. By a provision
of one of the annual insolvent laws, 1791, cb. 73, s. 11, which has
been often re-enacted, and is now the standing law of the State,
it is declared, that if a creditor, to whom a real debt is due, shall
collude with the debtor to gain an undue preference, or for con-
cealment of any part of the debtor's estate, or shall concert any
acknowledgment of the debtor, or any kind of security, to give
false color to his claim for more than is bona fide due, such credi-
tor, shall lose his debt truly due; 1805. ch. 110, s. 12: evidently, as
a punishment for his fraudulent and corrupt attempt to prejudice
or cheat others. A similar legal provision forms a part of the
Code of England, Scotland, France, Spain and Hindostan. Cooper's
Ranker Law, Ad-den. 12, 18; Kames' Prin. Eq. b. 3, c. 5. page 455,
note 457.

Taking this view of the .subject, it is clear, that a mere devise
over will not, in all cases, cause the forfeiture to be enforced on a
suit's being brought; but, it must clearly appear, from the nature
of the case, that the institution of the suit can only be considered
as the commencement or partial execution of a corrupt and frau-
dulent design to injure others, or those to whom, in such an event,
the legacy is given over. For it would be a strange inconsistency
* to impute to any testator, that he intended to expose the
281 object of his bounty to be disappointed by accident or
caprice; or that he should seriously have intended to prohibit him
from asking the aid of a Court of justice to obtain that which he
had actually given him.

In this case I find it impossible to believe, that Ann Russell
really intended to declare, that any one of her descendants, about
whom she has manifested so much impartial solicitude, should
forfeit her legacy by claiming it in any form of suit; and that it
should, in such case, vest in persons toward whom she entertained
no such specially kind and maternal feelings; and who too, by
being nominated as the executors, arbitrators, and legatees over,
were so deeply interested, and had it so much in their power to
provoke a suit so as to produce a forfeiture. I therefore hold,
that this clause of this wiil, requiring all disputes to be submitted
to arbitration, is to be regarded in no other light than as a strong
admonition or threat intended to preserve harmony among the
various objects of her bounty.