CAMPBELL'S CASE.—2 BLAND. 221

ficient evidence of the assent of the party; Katne's Pri. Equi. b. 1,
pt. 1, s. 4; 2 Sugd. Pow. 97; 1800, ch. 54; 1801, ch. 53 and 96; 1802,
ch. 37; 1805, ch. 68; 1807, ch. 5; or, it may, without injuriously af-
fecting the interests of any one, but for the benefit of all, author-
ize a sale, a settlement, or the disposition of an estate to be con-
firmed or made, which was impracticable, according to the estab-
lished rules of law, by reason of the infancy, Blois v. Hereford, 2
Vern. 501; Attorney-General v. Day, 1 Ves. 224; Taylor v. Philips,
2 Ves. 23; Hearle v. Greenbank, 3 Atk. 712; 1800, ch. 54; 1803, ch.
72 and 90; 1819, ch. 38; the coverture, Harvey v. Ashley, 3 Atk. 613;
1802, ch. 8; 1813, ch. 134 and 153; 1818, ch. 58; 1822, ch. 111; the
lunacy, Shelf. Lun. 372; 1784, ch. 1; 1805. ch. 56; 1809, ch, 41; 1821,
cli. 210, or the alienage, 1800, ch. 68; 1807, ch. 10, 11 and 86, of one
or more of the parties concerned; or it may, without prejudice,
authorize the making of leases, 1802, ch. 40; or the execution of a
power, Hearle v. Greenbank, 1 Ves. 305; 1826, ch. 163; 1827, ch. 73;
or the making provision for a wife or children, or the selling of
estates to pay debts or the like. Ridout v. Plymouth, 2 Atk. 105;
Buchanan v. Hamilton, 5 Ves. 722; Wallwyn v. Lee, 9 Ves. 24; Com.
Dig. Tit. Parliament, H. 5; 1804, ch. 11; 1813, ch. 134; 1815, ch.
151.

A contract of marriage is, in many respects, so highly important
in its nature, as not only to involve, the interests and happiness of
the immediate parties, and to require the free consent of a man
and woman who have a perfect bodily (Sabell's Case, Dyer, 179;
Bury's Case, 5 Co. 99), and mental capacity to contract, 1 Blac. Cow.
439; but it is a contract to which society is a party, and in which
it has a deep interest; and on that account it is, perhaps, that a
marriage, which has been fairly and legally consummated, cannot
be dissolved by a judicial determination, founded on any subse-
quent breach of its terms, without the consent, of the community
expressed by its representative Legislature, or by the supreme au-
thority of the State. The Spiritual Court, in England, and some
of the Courts of justice of Maryland, have been clothed with au-
thority to determine on the validity of a contract of marriage, yet
they cannot divorce from the bonds of matrimony for any cause
.subsequent to the marriage; for, if there has been a valid marriage
those tribunals are not competent to rescind it, so that a

* sentence of divorce is not so properly a dissolution of the 236
contract as a declaration of its original absolute nullity. Bac. Abr.
Tit. Marriage and Divorce, E. 3; Ryan v. Ryan, 1 Ecclesi. Rep. 274;
February, 1777, ch. 12, s. 15. Hence, it seems to have been gener-
ally admitted, that the constitutional restriction, which declares
that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of con-
tracts, does not extend to a contract of marriage, Dartmouth Col-
lege v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 629, 693; and therefore, that the Gen-
eral Assembly may, by law, grant a divorce from the bonds of