218 CAMPBELL'S CASE.—2 BLAND.

or a sovereignty. For, wherever the law expresses its distrust of
abuse of power, it always vests a superior coercive authority in
some other hand to correct it; the very notion of which destroys
the idea of sovereignty. 1 Blac. Com. 244. Ours is a government
assumed under the authority of the people; it originated from the
people, is founded in compact only, and instituted solely for the
good of the whole; and all persons invested with the legislative
or executive powers of government are the trustees of the public,
and as such * accountable for their conduct. Decla. Rights
232 Maryland, Art. 1 and 4. These are our fundamental axioms
and first principles; consequently, the General Assembly, or all,
or any portion of our government cannot exercise sovereign author-
ity, in any case, over any subject whatever; since it is clear that,
when regarded in this point of view, our whole government must
be considered as strictly limited, as well by its general nature, as
by the special provisions of the Constitution itself. Here, there-
fore, the sovereignty belongs altogether and exclusively to the
people of the State. Vanhorn's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2-Doll. 311:
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 John. Rep.
477; Enslin v. Bowman, 6 Binney, 471; Trusttees of the Unir entity
v. Foy. 2 Hay-wood, 310, 374; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peters,
380; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters, 628; Crane v. Meginnis. I
G. & J. 463.

It is declared, that the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct
from each other; Decla. Rights Maryland, Art. 6; that no State
shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing
the obligation of contracts: Const. IT. S. Art. 1. s. 10: and that
no freeman ought to be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized of his
freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any
manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property,
but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. Decla.
Eights Maryland, Art. 21. Consequently, the General Assembly
must be considered as restrained, not only by the general princi-
ples and delegated nature of the government itself, from exercis-
ing any arbitrary power over the rights or property of an indivi-
dual; but according to this declared separation of powers, and
under the positive restrictions by which its powers are limited, it
can exercise no authority which is manifestly beyond the confines
of its own legitimate sphere as a legislative department. Berrett
v. Oliver, 7 G. & J. 206. It cannot adjudicate upon any matter
in the manner of a Court of justice; Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Joint.
Rep. 508; Evans v. Eaton, 3 Wheat. 513; Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. &
J. 476; it can make no partial distinctions among citizens, Kames
Pri. Eq. b. 2, c. 3; Decla. Eights Maryland, Art. 39; or pass any
law impairing the obligation of contracts; nor can it be allowed to
assume the truth of any facts upon which of itself to pronounce a