216 CAMPBELL'S CASE.—2 BLAND.

private Acts had beeii passed by the Parliament of England,
upon false suggestions, they were, upon that ground alone, vacated
by the Court of Chancery on a bill tiled by the party grieved. 5
Cruise Dig. tit. 33, *. 51, 53; 2 Blac. Com. 346.

It seems to be generally admitted, in England, that the rehearsal
or recital of general and public facts and circumstances in a statute
cannot be denied; such as the rehearsal in the Statute de Donis of
what was the common law before the passing of that Act, Co. Litt.
19, or the recital in a statute, that great outrages had been com-
mitted in a certain part of the country; and that therefore the
statute was * passed. Rex v. Sutton, 4 Ma. & Sel. 532.
230 Such statements of facts, of a public nature, upon which the
Government had acted, must, for all such public purposes, be
taken to be true. But then no particular fact can be assumed or
declared by the Legislature to be true so far as to affect the rights
of a person, or the title of an individual to any property. Not
because it would be indecent or improper to question the motives
or purity of the Legislative body, who must always be presumed
to act rightly and to set forth the truth, until the contrary is
clearly shewn; but because, in all such cases, it may, without any
impeachment of their integrity, be presumed that they have been
misled or misinformed. As where a statute recited, that a certain
person had been attainted, when in truth such was not the fact,
the party was not thereby concluded and prevented from shewing
the truth. The Earl of Leicester v. Heydon, 1 Plow. 398. And
so where the preamble of an Act of Parliament recited, that the
plaintiff's father had not been married, yet he was allowed to
prove that he had been married; and so to obtain a verdict,
founded upon the fact of his legitimacy, in direct opposition to
the recital in the Act of Parliament. Bull. N. P. 112; Co. Litt.
300. But the Parliament of England, on principles of State policy,
not applicable to cases of a civil nature, have, in many instances,
passed bills of attainder, by which facts have been assumed to be
true, without the formality of proof, and individuals have been
attainted, condemned to death, and their estates confiscated with-
out even calling on them to answer. It cannot be denied, that

the party's own state of the case, this rule should not be extended further
than the particular facts mentioned; but, I apprehend, it ought not to be
presumed, that every thing is fully stated, and that all facts and circum-
stances are disclosed, that are necessary to give a perfect insight into the
merits of the bill; for though the facts alleged may be true, yet other facts
may be sunk, which may alter the case, and defeat the allegations of the
bill; neither do I think it safe to argue from the analogy and reason of penal
laws in the plantations, to a bill of this kind; because rules of state policy
are no proper measure to adjust private property."—3 Chalmer's Opin. Em.
Lawyers, 8, 10, 41; Partridge v. Dorsey, 3 H. & J. 307, note; Owings v. Speed,
5 Wheat. 420.