212 CAMPBELL'S CASE.—2 BLAND.

tor has been fully established, to order the real estate of the de-
ceased to be sold for the payment of his debts. 1785, ch. 72, s. 5.

In this instance, the claim of these plaintiffs, as designated, has
been admitted, and the insufficiency of the personal assets for the
payment of that claim has also been distinctly admitted; and,
therefore, upon these admissions, which the committee of the luna-
tic, and the guardian ad litem, of the infant were competent to
make, since the answer of a lunatic by his committee may be read
against him, as an answer of one of full age and sound mind.
Leving v. Carerly, Prec, Chan. 229; Wilson v. Grace, 14 Ves, 172.
And the answer of an infant by his guardian ad litem, at least in
cases of this kind, may be read, against him also, as if made by
him when of full age, Hammond v. Hammond, post; there can be
no doubt as to the power and duty of the Chancellor immediately
to decree a sale of the real estate for the payment of the debts of
the deceased, without regard to any postponement or delay to
which a lunatic or infant was formerly entitled, or with which they
might otherwise have been indulged.

All real estate in Maryland has been made subject to be taken
and sold for the satisfaction of the debts of its owner; yet that has
not in any manner affected the debtor's right to alien, or devise it
bond fide, in any way he may think proper. It has, however, been
declared by statute, that all devises in fraud of creditors, shall be
deemed void, 3 W. and M. c. 14; that is, where the debtor devises
his real estate to any one, without leaving a sufficiency in the
hands of his heir, or executor, to pay his debts. Yet, if a testator
devises real estate for the payment of his debts, in a way that may
be sufficient and effectual for that purpose, it will not be affected
by this statute. * But if the real estate set apart by the tes-
226 tator for the payment of his debts be insufficient, or be given
in such a manner as to be ineffectual, then it will be considered as
coming within the meaning of this statute, and be deemed void.
Otherwise the creditors must take that real estate of the deceased
debtor which he has devised for their benefit, and none other.
Hughes v. Doulben, 2 Bro. C. C. 614; S. C. 2 Cox, 170; Booth v.
Blundell, 19 Fes. 528; Ashby v. Palmer, 1 Meriv. 296; Pow. Mort.
by Coven, 69, 325.

Here it is alleged and admitted, that the whole of the. personalty,
together with the real estate, devised by this testator to be sold
for the payment of his debts, is wholly inadequate for that purpose.
There being, then, an admitted deficiency of the devise for the
payment of debts, it falls within the operation of the statute, and
must be deemed, as against creditors, absolutely null and void.
The case being thus cleared of all embarrassment by reason of that
devise, it follows that the real estate of this deceased debtor must
be dealt with, in all respects, as if he had made no provision what