CAMPBELL'S CASE.—2 BLAND. 197

To constitute 6uch a lis pendens in this Court it is sufficient that there be a
bill filed and a subpoena returned served in a. suit, the object of which
is to affect the right to the debts.

Several suits, the objects of which are to have the same estate applied in
satisfaction of the same set of creditors, may be consolidated.

THIS bill was tiled on the 22nd of January, 1824, by Edward
Campbell, Randolph Campbell, James Cunningham, and Catherine

of fact, affects the purchaser in the same manner as if he had such notice,
and he will accordingly be bound by the judgment or decree in the suit.
Inloes v. Harvey, 11 Md. 524. This case is approved in Tilton v. Cofield, 93 U.
S. 168, where it was held that he who intermeddles with property in litiga-
tion does it at his peril, and is as conclusively bound by the results of the
litigation, whatever they may be, as if had been a party to it from the out-
set. See to the same effect, Boulden v. Lanahan, 29 Md. 201; Hall v. Jack.
33 Md. 253.

A creditors' bill to be a Us pendens and to operate as a notice against real
estate must be so definite in the description of the estate, as that any one
reading it can learn thereby what property is the subject of the litigation.
If it is not so, it will be postponed to a junior bill, which is. Miller v. Sherry.
2 Wallace, 237. And to affect a party as a purchaser pendente life it is neces-
sary to show that the holder of the legal title was impleaded before the pur-
chase which is to be set aside. Ibid. 250.

A decree in equity for the sale of lands to pay debts and legacies, or for
the purpose of distributing the proceeds among those entitled, is a proceed-
ing in rem. Persons who come into the possession of the land pendente life,
claiming title to it under the parties to the bill or some of them, stand in the
same predicament with, those whom they represent in point of interest.
Tongue v. Morion. 6 H. & J. 21. But a person iu possession claiming ad-
versely and not a party to the decree cannot be affected by it. Ibid. Where
a grantee of land, pending a proceeding against him to set asid(3 the deed
to him as fraudulent, makes a conveyance of the land, the persons to whom
he so conveys need not be made parties to the suit, and are in no better con-
dition than the person under whom they claim. Shaferman v. O'Brien, 28
Md. 565. Of. Alexander v. Ghiselin, 5 Gill, 138, note, ad finem.

The doctrine of to pendens does not apply to a ease where a wife is suing
for a divorce and alimony, but only to a case where the proceeding directly
relates to the thing or property in question. Feighly v. Feighly, 7 Md. 538.
It is doubtful whether the doctrine of lis pendens applies to personal prop-
erty or not. See County of Warren v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96; Murray v. Lyl-
burn, 2 Johns. Ch. 441; McCutchen v. Miller, 31 Miss. 65; McLaurine v. Mon-
roe, 20 Mo. 462; Chose v. Scarles, 54 N. H. 511; Leitch v. Wells, 48 N. Y. 602.
But in 2 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. sec. 636, it is said to be the general rule that the
doctrine does not apply to ordinary suits concerning personal property, ex-
cept in the case of actions brought to enforce a trust extending over chat-
tels and securities not negotiable in their nature.

A decree will not be binding upon a purchaser pendente lite unless the
suit has been prosecuted in good faith and with reasonable diligence. Price
v. McDonald, 1 Md. 412. But " the abatement of the suit by the death of
a party will not destroy its effect as lis pendens, provided it is revived with-
out unnecessary delay. Even a judgment in favor of the defendant does
not necessarily at once terminate the Us pendens. If the unsuccessful party
is entitled to an appeal, the constructive notice continues during a reason-
able time for an appeal to be taken." 2 Pomeroy. sec. 634.