WINDER v. DIFFENDERFFER.—2 BLAND. 193

Avith it; or using it in the course of his trade, has been deemed
sufficient evidence of his deriving such a profit from it as to au-
thorize the Court to charge him with interest upon each annual
amount of interest. Newton v. Bennet, 1 Bro. C. C. 359; Rocke v.
Hart, 11 Vex. 59; Raphael v. Boelim, 11 Vex. 92; S. C. 13 Ves.
408 d; 591; Tebbx v. Carpenter, I Mad. Rep. 290; Attorney-General
v. Solly, 2 Cond. Chan. Rep. 528; Ringgold v.Ringgold, 1 H. &
G. 12.

In the case under consideration, it very satisfactorily appears to
have been the duty of the defendant, John Diffenderffer, to have
applied the rents and profits received by him, for the benefit of all
the devisees of the late Charles Rogers; and that, instead of doing
so, he deposited them, as received, in bank as his own, drew them
out, made purchases, and used them for his own use and benefit
exclusively. What advantages he derived from those rents and
profits, thus mingled with his own money, from the time of their
being deposited in bank, has not been shewn; but such a manage-
ment must have been very beneficial to himself, and greatly inju-
rious to the devisees. Such a course of conduct by any one, stand-
ing as this defendant, John Diffenderffer, did, bound to make the
funds received by him productive, or constantly useful to those
entitled to them, cannot be tolerated by this Court. I am, there-
fore, of opinion, that he has been correctly charged with interest
on the whole amount including principal and interest found to be
in his hands at each rest.

The next inquiry is as to the allowances which should be made
to the defendant, John Diffenderffer. In England, trustees are
never allowed anything as a compensation for their trouble, Sykes
v. Hastings, 11 Ves. 363; here it is otherwise; executors, and all
persons standing in the * situation of trustees, charged with
the care and management of an estate, are allowed a com- 207
pensation for their trouble in the form of a commission of so much
per cent, upon the amount collected and disbursed by them. In
many cases the commission is limited by positive law, 1798, ch. 101,
sub-ch. 10, a. 2: but in all cases its allowance within the prescribed
limits seems to be considered as an exercise of a discretionary
power which rests so exclusively with the Court of original juris-
diction, that it cannot be revised or controlled in any way what-
ever. Nicholls v. Hodges, 1 Peters, 502.

The Court of Chancery is peculiarly and absolutely civil in its
institution, and in all its modes of procedure. It is confined to
cases of distributive and commutative justice alone, and has no
jurisdiction whatever over torts or crimes. It dispenses no favors
nor does it administer vindictive justice in any form. 1 Fonb. 2;
Peake v. Highfield, 1 Russ. 560; Nash v. Nash, 4 Ecelesi. Rep. 357;
Singery v. Attorney-General, 2 H. & J. 497; Fornshill v. Murray, 1
Blund, 484. The principle upon which it awards simple or compound
13 2B.