WINDER v. DIFFENDERFFER.—2 BLAND. 189

if he had stood in that situation. Now before any of the principles,
upon this subject, can be brought to bear upon the case under con-
sideration, it must appear, that the plaintiff Araminta, or those un-
der whom she claims were the principal debtors; or that the trustee
Vincent was the principal; and that Catharine, or those claiming
under her, were their sureties; and that those claiming under
Catharine are now here-asking to be reimbursed, as such, out of
the funds of their principal now in the hands of the Court.

But the assumption of any such statement would be in direct
opposition to all the proofs in the case. Vincent, was a trustee
appointed by this Court for the benefit of all concerned in the estate
of the late Charles Eogers; and if he misapplied the rents and pro-
tits * which came to his hands, he alone is responsible. If

this Court were to make good to Catharine's representatives 202
any amount of the rents and profits which had been misapplied by
Vincent to their prejudice, out of the proportion of the funds now
about to be distributed, to which the plaintiff Araminta is entitled,
it would be, in effect, to treat her as the principal debtor, for
whose benefit, among others, Vincent was not merely a trustee,
subject only to the order of this Court; but, who was, in fact, her
own proper agent; or it would be to consider Araminta as the
surety of the trustee Vincent. But there is nothing in the case to
warrant the placing of Araminta in any such condition of re-
sponsibility; and therefore the representatives of the late Catha-
rine cannot sustain themselves on the stand they have taken by
any principles derivable from the case of a principal debtor and
surety.

But the representatives of the late Catharine, insist on having
the securities, or these assets, now about to be distributed, so
marshalled as to reimburse them to the amount of their share of the
rents and profits which had been misapplied by the former trustee,
Vincent.

The marshalling of securities is only made where the debt is
so secured as to give to the creditor the means of obtaining pay-
ment out of two funds, and others can reach only one of them. In
such case the Court will compel the creditor who holds the more
comprehensive security to obtain payment, as far as practicable,
out of the fund which the other creditors cannot reach; so as to
leave the other fund to be distributed among the creditors holding
more limited securities. 1 Nad. Chan. 250. But there is no sort
of analogy between the case of creditors, whose securities may
be thus marshalled, for the benefit of all, and without injury to
any, and the case now under consideration. The plaintiff
Araminta, and the representatives of the late Catharine, stand
precisely in the same situation; not as creditors seeking payment,
by way of preference, or otherwise, from the assets of a debtor;